Utah v. Lew Day : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
Utah v. Lew Day : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. McArthur Wright; Attorney for Appellant.
R. Paul Van Dam; Attorney General; Marian Decker; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation








 (JC/jST-J ~*N THE UTAH C0URT 0F APPEALS 
D p q t F T M r l v ^ ^ t 7 
STATE OF UTAH, : 7 005 /7-C/? 
Case No. 900419-CA 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
Priority No. 2 
v. : 
LEW DAY, : 
D e f endant/Appel1ant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF MANSLAUGHTER, A 
SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-205 (1990) IN THE SIXTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR PIUTE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE DON V. 
TIBBS, JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER (5688) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
Attorneys for Appellee 
J. McARTHUR WRIGHT 
P.O. Box 367 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Attorney for Appellant 
MAR 2 51991 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 





Case No. 900419-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION OF MANSLAUGHTER, A 
SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-205 (1990) IN THE SIXTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR PIUTE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE DON V. 
TIBBS, JUDGE, PRESIDING. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER (5688) 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1022 
Attorneys for Appellee 
J. McARTHUR WRIGHT 
P.O. Box 367 
St. George, Utah 84770 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
JURISDJ K ul' I'ROCKED (NGS 1 
STATEMENT - ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW.. L 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 1 
STATEMENT 4 
STATEMENT 0 FACTS. > 
SUMMARY ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT _ THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON THE LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE x/ 
POINT II DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL *x 
POINT III THE PROSECUTOR PROPERLY DISCUSSED THE 
EVIDENCE AND THE INFERENCES AND DEDUCTIONS 
ARISING THEREFROM DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S ALLEGATIONS OF IMPROPER JUROR/ 
WITNESS CONTACT HAVE NOT BEEN PRESERVED FOR 
REVIEW BY THIS COURT; ALTERNATIVELY, REVERSAL 
ON THAT GROUND IS NOT WARRANTED 
POINT V THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW.. 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 4 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 5 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 15 
ARGUMENT 17 
POINT I THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON THE LESSER 
INCLUDED OFFENSE OF NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE 17. 
POINT II DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL 21 
POINT III THE PROSECUTOR PROPERLY DISCUSSED THE 
EVIDENCE AND THE INFERENCES AND DEDUCTIONS 
ARISING THEREFROM DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT 29 
CONCLUSION 39 
-i-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES CITED 
Carpet Barn v. State of Utah# 786 P.2d 770 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990) 1 
City of Monticello v. Christensen, 788 P.2d 513 
(Utah), cert, denied. 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990) 1 
Logan City v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990) 36 
State v. Amicone# 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984) 17 
State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983) 18,21 
State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43 (Utah 1984) 24 
State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257 (Utah 1985) 21 
State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886 (Utah 1989) 22 
State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah 1986) 24 
State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527 (Utah 1983) 19 
State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401 (Utah 1986) 2,22,23 
State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273 (Utah 1989), cert. 
denied, 110 S.Ct. 1837 (1990) 3,38 
State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989) 32 
State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), 
cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990) 3,36,37 
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 3,38,39 
State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989) 2,35 
State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 1985) 3,37 
State v. Royball, 710 P.2d 168 (Utah 1985) 21 
State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 1988) 2,29,30 
State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988) 18,19,20 
State v. Sterger, No. 900078-CA slip op. at 4 n.2 
(Utah Ct. App. March 6, 1991) 17 
State v. Tempiin, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1990) 28 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987) 2,30,35 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) 2,22,23 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (1990) 18 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306 (1990) 20,21 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990) 4 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990) 1,4,21 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (Supp. 1990) 1 
• • • 
111-
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No. 900517-CA 
v. i 
LEW DAY, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of manslaughter, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 
(1990). This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's 
requested jury instruction on the additional lesser included 
offense of negligent homicide? The trial court's decision that a 
defendant is not entitled to a lesser included offense 
instruction is a conclusion of law. Carpet Barn v. State of 
Utah, 786 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). A trial court's 
legal conclusion is not accorded any particular deference and is 
reviewed for its correctness. City of Monticello v. Christensen, 
788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied, 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990). 
2. Was defendant adequately represented at trial in 
accord with his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel? Review of this issue is based on a determination of 
whether counsel's performance was deficient and, if so, whether 
the deficient performance prejudiced defendant. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 
401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
3. Was the prosecutor's discussion of the evidence and 
inferences therefrom in closing argument proper? In reviewing an 
allegation of prosecutorial misconduct, this Court must determine 
whether the prosecutor's remarks called the attention of the jury 
to matters "they would not be justified in considering in 
reaching the verdict and, if so, whether there is a reasonable 
likelihood" that the remarks "so prejudiced the jury that there 
would have been a more favorable result absent the misconduct." 
State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988); State v. Tillman, 
750 P.2d 546, 559-61 (Utah 1987). In determining whether a 
remark is prejudicial the alleged misconduct must be viewed in 
light of the totality of the trial and the trial court's ruling 
on this matter will not be overturned absent an abuse of 
discretion. Speer, 750 P.2d at 190. 
4. Did defendant fail to preserve his allegation of 
improper juror witness contact by failing to object to the 
alleged contact when he became aware of it during the course of 
trial? The Utah Supreme Court has held that "invited error [] is 
procedurally unjustified and viewed with disfavor, especially 
where ample opportunity has been afforded to avoid such a result. 
State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 (citing State v. Tillman, 
750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987). 
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Notwithstanding defendant's apparent waiver, assuming 
this Court considers defendant's allegations of impropriety, was 
the incidental and inconsequential juror witness contact 
sufficient to raise a presumption of prejudice? A rebuttable 
presumption of prejudice arises from unauthorized contact between 
jurors and trial witnesses and/or court personnel which goes 
beyond "a mere incidental, unintended, and brief contact." State 
v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 280 (Utah 1985); State v, Jonas, 793 P.2d 
902, 908 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 
1990). 
5. Was the evidence presented at trial sufficient to 
sustain defendant's conviction for the lesser included offense of 
manslaughter? The power of this Court to review a jury verdict 
challenged on the sufficiency of the evidence is "quite limited." 
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The 
evidence, along with the reasonable inferences from it, must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. State v. 
Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 
1837 (1990). Where the defendant has failed to marshal all the 
evidence in support of the jury's verdict and then demonstrate 
that even viewing it in the light most favorable to the verdict, 
the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, this Court 
may properly decline to consider the sufficiency of the evidence 
adduced. State v. Moore, 802 P.2d at 738-39 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Lew Day, was charged with one count of 
murder in the second degree, a first degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990) (Record [hereinafter R.] at 
1). On March 30, 1990, defendant was convicted by a jury of the 
lesser included offense of manslaughter, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990) (R. at 195). 
Defendant was sentenced May 3, 1990, to the indeterminate term of 
not less than one year nor more than 15 years with credit for 
time served (R. at 243). In addition, defendant's sentence was 
enhanced by one year for use of a firearm (R. at 243). 
Defendant subsequently filed a motion for new trial on 
May 23, 1990 alleging, among other things: improper juror 
witness contact; new exculpatory evidence (R. at 246-52). The 
trial court denied defendant's motion in a memorandum decision on 
August 16, 1990 on the ground that defendant was unable to "point 
to clear definitive evidence. . . . " The trial court stated that 
"proper investigatory work" had been conducted and defendant's 
Defendant was represented by Marcus Taylor and David Blackwell 
at trial. Shortly after filing the motion for new trial, Taylor 
filed a motion to withdraw as counsel (R. at 293, 314). In an 
order issued June 13, 1990, the trial court granted Taylor's 
request to withdraw and appointed James L. Shumate to represent 
defendant (R. at 304). Shumate subsequently filed a memorandum 
in support of a previous motion that Taylor had filed requesting 
the appointment of an investigator and, in addition, requested a 
hearing on the new trial motion (R. at 323-43). The trial court 
denied the motions in a memorandum decision (R. at 398-424). 
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alleged grounds for a new li±uJ U - I U L U H J i<> " nwly discovered 
evidence' new exculpatory evidence' have been examined and 
, much of what has been proffered i s not • 
newly-discovered evidence" (R. at 4I'll, 4 l\ ) . 
The trial court similarly denied defendant's claims 
concerr ; :« t D f ^ grounds that the limited 
contact between juror Grover Smith .a : < - , 
deputy Robert Nalwalker, was "authorized by the Court" , "did 
not relate j<» t. |M 11 \ *> *; * iid ^t 
"involve discussion a v . personal or private ^aii-, ^ . . . . 
such that xu would breed a sense of familiarity" (R. 416-1 8; a 
copy of the trial cuuil *s Kumar (avium Decision In Re Post-Trial 
Motions is attached hereto as Addendum A ) . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the morning of August 9 19i|ll, 1 »"w i«- ":'iuiweeks and 
David Kile, the victim in this case, finished loading a truck for 
then "iii|]!MyHi ,•! * In1 Vidrine Sawmill in Escalante, Utah, before 
taking the rest of the day off to drive l. o Ci rclevl! le in ah in 
Sudweeks's pickup truck (Transcript of jury trial, March 28( 1989 
[here. ."v Transcript >f preliminary hearing, 
November ?r - [hereinaiu : { v x, .::; • , • : 
Circleville later that evening, Sudweeks ^..\ ;ie vn-*,t * * <-
I , diL^JL having t evv :rinks," they 
spent the night - ^hp next morn. 
Sudweeks drank some beer while Kile : J Wiltshire drank some 
vodka before ~ t . <k and drove *•> -t 
local C-Mart where Wiltshire purchased "»i cold pad' ml been "  (T. 
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at 470, 467). After leaving C-Mart the three friends stopped at 
Larry's Service Station in Circleville to talk to the defendant, 
Lew Day (T. at 470). Defendant then joined Sudweeks, Kile and 
Wiltshire and the four men decided to go "riding around" (T. at 
470). Sudweeks and Kile waited at the service station for 
Wiltshire to drive his truck home and return with defendant in 
his truck to pick them up (T. at 470). With defendant behind the 
wheel, the four men decided to drive to Junction, Utah, where 
they purchased more beer and gas for defendant's truck (T. at 
2 
471). The foursome then headed north toward Piute Reservoir 
near Marysvale, Utah, continuing to drink along the way (T. at 
471-472). 
The men stopped up Bullion Canyon, just outside 
Marysvale, to drink some more beer and talk about hunting and 
fishing (T. at 472). Defendant expressed a desire to "ride up 
over the top of the mountain" until Sudweeks told him that he 
(Sudweeks) and Kile had to be back to work in Escalante the next 
morning (T. at 472-473). Approximately one hour passed before 
the men drove back to Marysvale to purchase more liquor (T. at 
3 
473, 505). After leaving the liquor store defendant drove to a 
bar at the south end of Marysvale where the four men did some 
more drinking and shot pool for approximately one hour (T. at 
Defendant occupied the driver's side of the truck with Sudweeks 
seated next to him, then Kile and Wiltshire by the passenger door 
(T. at 471). 
3 
Cleora Petersen, who runs the Marysvale liquor store, testified 
that Wiltshire purchased 2 liters of Canadian Host and one / half 
gallon of vodka, as well as another liquor she could not recall, 
at approximately 1:00 p.m. on August 10, 1989 (T. at 636-639). 
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473-74, 508), The men then drove -' .n end 
of Marysvale where they did more drinking and shot more pool in%. 
,j| 4". I) "' Atl'.ei" Ipavinf) Sue' F Bax at approximately ^ f J, , 
defendant apparently drove south east ni - I 
Thompsonville Road (T. at 47 5) ' As they drove slowly southward 
along Tl lompsoi ivi lie I in IIN1 f ;.«id drinking and talking, 
stopping approximately three different times to uriridLe (' 
476-78). 
The : . :• ; • , ijiatc <"i fourth time just 
north of a gate leading * ;he Henrie property on the east side 
i Thompsonville Road > copy of State's Exhibit #6 
depicting the scene oi tin- slto* 1 i n«) i* jltd-'b I hor^-io as 
Addendum E" Defendant got out of the truck first and said "Wait 
.i minute," -if' '1P reached in and removed - ,22 caliber rifle and a 
.270 caliber rifle from a gun racK LII at i :)f h i s • tin: iick before 
the other men could exit the vehicle . at 18:5-187, 478) After 
defendant removed his Sudweeks
 y^t out followed by Kile 
Sudweeks estimated that they had each had approximately five to 
eight beers apiece before even entering the bar (T at 508), 
5 
Emma Sue Tiller, who runs Sue's Bar, testified that defendant, 
Sudweeks, Kile and Wiltshire arrived at the bar between 3:30 p.m. 
and 4:00 p.m. (T. at 607). She further testified that in her 
opinion Wiltshire was "drunk," and "Kile and Lewis Sudweeks were 
well on their way. And of the three, Lew Day was the soberest" 
(T. at 608). In response to the prosecutor's question asking 
whether she had observed any argument between the men, Tiller 
related an incident between Kile and Wiltshire (T. at 608). 
Apparently Kile attempted to take a drink of Wiltshire's whiskey 
and Wiltshire told him to ask first (T. at 608). Defendant went 
over to talk to the two men, after which they appeared to 
"mellow" (T. at 608r 642, 647, 650). 
Although Sudweeks testifed that defendant headed south east out 
of Marysvale after leaving Sue's Bar, several of the bar patrons 
who observed the men that evening testifed that they watched 
defendant's truck head west (T at 643, 648, 651). 
n 
(T. at 478). Wiltshire, who had apparently passed out, remained 
seated next to the passenger door of defendant's truck (T. at 
158, 252, 478). Defendant stood in front of the truck holding 
both of his rifles while Kile apparently walked southeast away 
from the truck toward the Henrie gate to urinate (T. at 478, 
481). Sudweeks urinated while standing behind the open driver's 
side door of defendant's truck (T. at 478, 484). From that 
vantage point, Sudweeks observed defendant make a comment to 
Kile, who had his back to defendant, and then point the .22 
caliber rifle and shoot Kile in the head (T. at 482). Although 
Sudweeks heard two shots fired he was not sure whether Kile fell 
after the first or second shot (T. at 483). 
After shooting Kile, defendant stated, "I'll have all 
you bastards in a pile before the night's over," as he began 
walking north toward his truck and Sudweeks (T. at 483-485, 547-
48). Sudweeks slipped back behind the truck and squatted down 
(T. at 486-89). When defendant stooped over in the cab of the 
truck, apparently reaching for something on the floor boards, 
Sudweeks ran southwest away from the truck toward US-89 and up a 
steep bank which dropped off farther south near the Morrill ranch 
house (T. at 486-89). Sudweeks heard gunshots as he ran away 
from the truck and gravel "flew up" under his feet (T. at 494). 
Just as the sun was going down on the evening of August 
10, 1989, Harold Morrill observed Sudweeks approach his house 
from a kitchen window and stepped outside on the porch to see 
what was going on (T. at 616). Sudweeks, who was winded from his 
run up the bank, had slowed to a walk by the time he reached the 
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ML.)i J J i in noun1 mi lit h\/). Sudweeks sat down on the Morrill 
porch and told Harold that defendant n-m Nipped mi iMM I Hi 
been shooting -•*!•- , 489-90; 616 :-en asked for Dale 
Morril. When Harold told 
Sudweeks that n::- father was 'uf moving sprinklers" Sudweeks 
asked Harolc * ^  go back * * r*e truck with ' \o talk to 
defendant {' dr.-1-ned. explaining that he 
couldn't lea-*j ' \> :hildre3 iudweek 
Harold that he - going back to make sure that [he] had seen 
what [he] seen" * (^i- :-L l e n Harold that he 
thought Kile had been shot at that time because he "wanted 
8 
make sure he knew what he was talking about" I at 2~_ After 
Harold went back inside Sudweeks 
apparently remained sitting on the porch for a short while before 
wal .» . > * m e that leads f the Morrill home and 
climbing back .. : .t ; vim1 of t he shooting 
near Henrie's gate -91-92, 623). 
As IK I * . ; tuwdid Henrie's gate from the top - •• 
embankment near the Morrill home, Sudweeks saw KLle "si < ivuig 
j_n the road," and observed that Kile's feet appeared to be 
7 
Harold testified that Sudweeks wab ^ ux^x holding a beer as he 
approached the house and that he sat on the porch sipping the 
beer as he told Harold about defendant (T. at 617-620). Sudweeks 
testified that he was unable to recall having had a beer in his 
hand when he first talked to Harold that evening (T. at 529). 
8 
Harold testified that although lie had asked Sudweeks to come 
inside, Sudweeks declined saying he would wait on the steps (T. 
at 617). Harold also testified that after Sudweeks told him that 
defendant had been shooting at him, he asked for a ride home, as 
well as for Harold to go back with him to the truck to talk to 
defendant (T. at 616). Harold did not hear any shots that 
evening (T. at 620), 
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"shaking," and "kicking" (T. at 493). Sudweeks then ran back to 
the Morrill's, stumbling down the embankment in his haste (T. at 
493). Without knocking, Sudweeks burst inside the Morrill home, 
knocking the door off its hinges as he entered (T. at 494, 618-
19, 629). Dale Morrill had just returned form changing 
sprinklers when Sudweeks burst through the door to his home and 
told him to "get in touch with the Sheriff" (T. at 494, 629).9 
At the time he burst through the door Sudweeks appeared "really 
scared" and "hysterical" (T. at 618-19, 630). It took Dale and 
Harold approximately five minutes to calm Sudweeks down so that 
they could understand him (T. at 630). Apparently Sudweeks did 
not tell Dale that he thought defendant had shot Kile until 
things had calmed down a little later in the evening, after the 
ambulance had arrived, and he was waiting for his brother to come 
and get him (T. 631). Like his son Harold, Dale Morrill did not 
hear any of the shots fired that night (T. at 632). 
Piute County Sheriff Brent Gottfredson arrived at the 
Morrill home shortly after 9:00 p.m. that evening in response to 
information that there had been a shooting nearby (T. at 141, 
150). After talking to Sudweeks and the Morrills, Sheriff 
Harold was not sure how long Sudweeks was gone from the porch 
before he burst through the door that evening (T. 618-23). After 
speaking briefly with Sudweeks, Harold went inside the house to 
retrieve his daughter from the bathtub; when he came back 
outside, Sudweeks was gone (T. at 618). Harold testified that 
his father, Dale Morrill, arrived home approximately 10-15 
minutes after that (T. at 618). He had just started telling his 
father about Sudweeks first visit when Sudweeks burst through the 
door (T. at 618). During cross-examination, Harold said that it 
was possible that Sudweeks could have been gone for approximately 
20 to 30 minutes (T. at 620). Sudweeks testified that he was 
gone less than 10 minutes (T. at 559). 
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Gottfredson headed i .waul Ihr Kcnrji' gat t c investigate 
the shooting ( Stopping his vehicle approximately 40 
I wet. south of Sheriff Gottfredson approached the 
scene and noticed that the driver's side docm 1 cleft»iidant "'i. 
truck was open and that Wiltshire, who appeared to be 
u n c o J i s c 1111 J s , A1 r i". i i i 1 i 1111 i n i : i 11 * - ( r • a t 1 b 8 , 1 h i, 2 5 2 ) . 
Determining that Kile w as s ti 1 ] al i ve, Sheri i I (;# >1 t 1 i #*ch n v,iilmj 
for an ambulance and began administering first did ("I, nt 158-
ie and Wiltshire, Sheriff 
Gottfredson began to search the surrounding area tm evidence iT 
at 159, 217). 
A. |i(H t ( f Ii in i \\vr- si iqat inii that evening, Sheriff 
Gottfredson checked the location of defendant's truck by 
measuring the distance between Kile's body and the truck and 
noting its relatione ,j •-* • i. at 
161), As he began u •.*:** around the area, Sheriff Gottfredson 
discovered tw « :> 22 caliber brass casings that evening, one 
approximately 1 8 inches noi t i"« <«I 1 he him MI |^>« >i 1 H 1 i by F i 1 *:•» * s 
head and another one approximately four inches south of the blood 
Kile's body was found lying approximately 23 feet from 
defendant's truck which was parked on the east side of 
Thompsonville Road facing south (T. at 162, 169, 263-64). Blood 
from Kile's head wound left a stain approximately 10 feet west of 
the north post of Henrie's gate (T. at 161, 263-64). A urine 
stain was observed on the ground near the driver's side door of 
defendant's truck (T. at 271). 
Defense witness Paul Hampton, the wrecker operator who towed 
defendant's truck from the scene, testified that State's Exhibit 
2, a drawing of the scene used to facilitate testimony, did not 
comport with his memory of the positioning of defendant's truck 
which he believed was a little further south than it appeared on 
the exhibit (T. at 720-723 The State conceded that the exhibit 
was not drawn, to seal e (T 7 2 7 ) . 
spot (T. at 163). Sheriff Gottfredson marked the location of 
the shell casings he discovered that night by drawing an X in the 
dirt with his foot (T. at 266). Although the area around the 
Morrill ranch house and Henrie's gate apparently experienced a 
light rain the night of the shooting, those marks were still 
present the next morning, August 11, 1989, when Sheriff 
Gottfredson returned to the scene to continue his investigation 
and make more precise measurements (T. at 266; P.H. at 29). 
Approximately, four officer's assisted in the 
investigation and search for defendant that evening (T. at 218). 
Sheriff Gottfredson told the officers assisting him in the 
investigation to keep the general public away from the scene and 
road blocks were set up in Garfield County at the junction of US-
89 and highway 20 in Marysvale (T. at 258, 324). Deputy Robert 
Nalwalker patrolled an area west and north of the shooting 
including US-89 (T. at 302-304). At approximately 2:00 a.m. on 
the morning of August 11, 1989, Deputy Nalwalker was headed south 
on Thompsonville Road approximately 50 yards north of Henrie's 
William Albrecht, Jr., a specialist in firearms identification 
for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) testifed that the 
.22 caliber brass casings discovered by Sheriff Gottfredson were 
fired from defendant's .22 caliber rifle (T. at 370-75). Sheriff 
Gottfredson located three other rounds west of the south post of 
Henrie's gate, approximately 13-14 feet from the blood spot (T. 
at 168). Albrecht testified that although these three rounds had 
all come from the same gun, they had not come from defendant's 
.22 caliber rifle (T. at 370). 
Deputy William L. Brewer of the Sevier County Sheriff's Office 
assisted in the investigation of the shooting the night of August 
10, 1989, and he also discovered two .22 caliber shell casings 
approximately 10-15 feet west and a little south of the blood 
spot (T. at 202). Albrecht testified that the casings were the 
same as those discovered by Sheriff Gottfredson and had also been 
fired by defendant's .22 caliber rifle (T. at 375). 
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gate, whei ^ * * about a lift/' from 
the east side of M , - 304-05; Suspecting the \ elL 
ne from defendant, Deputy Nalwalker proceeded to the 
Morrill home where lie « IIICMI ,h"i I\i•'k11f•" |T, .it -M)fi). Accompanied 
by trooper Wayne Boltis, Deputy Nalwalker returned to Henrie's 
•Ljdtf? where the headlights «>t H , <~ vehicle shone -u defendant as he 
climbed through a rail nompsonville 
Road (T, at 306,- 333). Defendant was subsequently arrested and 
•i jpor ted 1 ,o the Sevier County Jail \ at 152, 307; Transcript 
; motion , limine hearing, * - - •1 * *- at 
17). search o: defendant's pocket shortly after his arrest 
uncove:*--" • aliber cartridges, as well as a full box of 
.22 caliber ammunition fr^ «t ). 
The investigation of the shooting continued near 
Henrie'b g<ili' tvuly lt"» in^t morning.,- August II, 19H^, (T, at 
256, 310-11 ). Apparently, no officers were siiailuniMJ ai I he 
scene of the shooting following the arrest of defendant at 
approx i nid u • I \ J ,()() J ,, « i A n n i j-i i i j
 f \(mi), until officers began 
searching the fields east cf Thompsonvil le Road some tuiit pi ior 
to 8:00 a,in that morning -.' 256-58 ^7-10). Deputy 
Nalwalkej , mi I appioximate - 1hf "ficers, began 
searching the area east of Thompsonville Road 
lx; After Sheriff Gottfredson arrived, at approximately ^;00 
a.m., the sedii'li iim 4 Thompsonville Road (T. 
12 
While Deputy Nalwalker had been using his search light to 
search the adjacent sagebrush and low hills earlier, he had 
turned it off a short while before hearing the yell (T. at 304). 
At the time he heard the yell no police identification lights 
were operating (T. at 304). 
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at 312). There the searchers picked up a track approximately 15 
to 100 yards from the scene of the shooting, which appeared to be 
heading in a northwesterly direction away from Thompsonville Road 
(T. at 173, 312). The track, which appeared to have been made by 
a small pair of western cowboy boots eventually led the searchers 
to the crest of a small hill overlooking the scene of the 
shooting where they discovered defendant's rifles, a pack of 
Marlboro cigarette's of the type defendant smoked, a Marlboro 
cigarette butt and defendant's lighter (T. at 174-87, 234, 285, 
314-316, 438-39). After a comparison of the boots defendant was 
wearing at the time of his arrest with the tracks they had 
discovered that morning, the searchers determined that the tracks 
13 had been made by defendant's boots (T. at 174-75, 315). 
The bullet fragments subsequently removed from Kile's 
head were sent to the FBI for analysis and determined to be brass 
coated .22 caliber fragments that were consistent with having 
been fired from defendant's .22 caliber rifle1 (T. 386-88). 
After a metal elements analysis it was determined that the bullet 
fragments removed from defendant's head were composed of elements 
Approximately five months after the shooting Deputy Nalwalker 
examined two pairs of Sudweeks's work boots and determined that 
they were not consistent with the tracks he had followed the 
morning of August 11, 1989 (T. at 319, 458-69). Deputy Nalwalker 
also examined four pairs of boots which Sudweeks rarely wore and 
kept at his family homestead in Kingston, Utah, and determined 
they were also inconsistent with the tracks followed the morning 
of August 11, 1989 (T. at 256, 356-7, 550). 
14 
Although defendant's .22 caliber rifle arrived intact for 
analysis at FBI headquarters in Washington D.C., the gun stock 
was apparently damaged in the mail on its way back to the Salt 
Lake County Sheriff's Department from FBI headquarters (T. at 
177-79). The FBI encountered no difficulties in conducting tests 
on defendant's .22 caliber rifle (T. at 177-79; 370-75). 
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identical to i In . •  I'IIIIIH'I «iiiuiin nu in defendant's 
pocket; thus, the FBI was able to conclude that the fragments had 
come from the same box e-" ammunition i r dt 4 02-04). 
Other evidence - I In pt ebrntj^l ,„ u ihe lu.dy oi uns> 
brief, as pertinent to specific arguments. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant w i equeFd:ed 
instruction on the additional lesser included offense of 
negligent homicide Defendant was not entitled to have the jury 
instructed regarding negligent homicide because he IM.S not Mini 
cannot indicate a rational basi ; i-i the evidence upon which the 
jury < i . : i . • a aim of both the charged offense 
of second degree murder ^ o ..).*• lesser included of tense of 
manslaughter on which they were properly instructed Although 
evideri ;e of del eiiduii 1 ', v. Iiiiitiuy i nloxication was admissable to 
negate the mens rea of murder L\\ the second degree, the jury 
could not properly rely > negate the culpable mental state 
of either recklessness <-.,. ,-, ,y i * yt:noe. "I'lius , although the jnry 
acquitted defendant of second degree murder because of 
intoxication, could not have similarly acquitted defendant of 
the lesser i m . :.:<•: diense nl teokJi^ oi mans 1 nughter. Defendant 
presented no additional evidence to suggest that he was otherwise 
unaware of the risk of death from mishandling and/or firing a .22 
caliber ri fie. 
Defendant was not denied his sixth amendment right to 
l he cl f eet, i vf» assistance of counsel. Although defendant raises a 
myriad of possibilities a& to \ , , 
done, he asserts that defense counsel's performance was 
ineffective with absolutely no discussion of the defense actually 
presented on his behalf, or how that defense, even assuming it 
was deficient, was also prejudicial. 
Defendant's allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in 
closing argument are similarly unsupported by a careful review of 
the record. As a general rule, counsel for each side has 
considerable latitude in commenting on the evidence and the 
inferences and deductions arising therefrom in closing argument. 
The prosecutor's closing argument in this case was properly 
within this latitude and defendant has failed to demonstirate that 
the prosecutor called the attention of the jurors to matters 
outside the record, nor has he demonstrated that the alleged 
misstatements so prejudiced the jury that there was a strong 
likelihood of a more favorable result absent the prosecutor's 
remarks. 
Defendant's allegation of improper juror witness 
contact has not been preserved for review by this Court. Because 
defense counsel was aware of the alleged improper contact during 
trial and took no action to challenge the alleged impropriety at 
that time, this Court may properly decline to review defendant's 
allegation on the ground of waiver. Even assuming this Court 
determines to look past defendant's waiver, the brief contact 
between Deputy Nalwalker and juror Smith did not amount to an 
improper "conversational contact," nor was it sufficient to breed 
an improper "sense of familiarity." Rather it was an incidental 
and inconsequential contact insufficient to raise a presumption 
of prejudice. 
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Finally, the evidence is sufficient to sustain 
defendant's conviction for the lesser included offense of 
manslaughter. Although defendant asserts that introduction of 
additional evidence might possibly have implicated someone else 
as the shooter, he has wholly failed to marshal the evidence in 
support of the jury's verdict and then demonstrate that even 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, 
the evidence is insufficient to support it. Therefore, this 
Court need not and should not consider defendant's challenge to 
the sufficiency of the evidence against him. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION ON THE LESSER INCLUDED 
OFFENSE OF NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. 
Defendant asserts that because the jury convicted him 
of the lesser included offense of manslaughter instead of murder 
in the second degree, "it is easy to see that [he] could have 
been convicted on the lesser-included offense of [n]egligent 
[hjomicide if the jury had been so instructed." In support of 
his assertion defendant merely notes that the "evidence in the 
case was clear that [he] was highly intoxicated at the time." 
(Br. of App. at 4). Defendant's minimal and conclusory analysis 
in support of his argument does not merit review by this Court. 
State v. Amicone# 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984); State v. 
Sterger, No. 900078-CA slip op. at 4 n.2 (Utah Ct. App. March 6, 
1991) (court declined to rule on defendant's arguments due in 
part to his failure to provide any meaningful analysis). Should 
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this Court determine that defendant's conclusory assertions merit 
review, the trial court's denial of defendant's requested 
15 instruction on negligent homicide was proper. 
In State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983), the Utah 
Supreme Court set out an evidence-based standard for determining 
whether to instruct a jury regarding a lesser included offense at 
the defendant's request. Ld. at 157. The Court determined that 
a defendant's requested lesser included instruction must be given 
if (1) the statutory elements of greater and lesser included 
offenses overlap to some degree, and (2) the evidence provides a 
"rational basis" for acquitting the defendant of the charged 
offense and convicting him of the included offense. Jki. at 158-
59; State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 266-67 (Utah 1988). See 
also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) (1990).16 Applying the Baker 
standard to the facts of this case, defendant was not entitled to 
At the outset of the State's analysis it is helpful to clarify 
the proceedings below. Defendant initially requested that the 
trial court instruct the jury solely on the offense charged, 
murder in the second degree, and that the trial court not 
instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of manslaughter 
(T. 817-18). In the event the trial court denied his request, 
defendant made an alternative request that the jury be allowed to 
consider not only the lesser included offense of manslaughter, 
but the lesser included offense of negligient homicide as well 
(T. at 818). The trial court subsequently instructed the jury as 
to the elements of murder in the second degree and manslaughter, 
but declined to give a negligent homicide instruction on the 
ground that there was no evidence to support the giving of such 
an instruction (T. at 820). 
1 6
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(4) provides: 
The court shall not be obligated to charge 
the jury with respect to an included offense 
unless there is a rational basis for a 
verdict acquitting the defendant of the 
offense charged and convicting him of the 
included offense. 
_1 Q_ 
have the jury instructed on the additional lesser included 
offense of negligent homicide. Admittedly, murder in the second 
degree, manslaughter and negligent homicide stand in a greater 
and lesser included offense relationship, State v. Crick, 675 
P.2d 527, 529-30 (Utah 1983); however, the evidence of 
intoxication presented at trial provided a rational basis for 
acquitting defendant solely of the charged offense of second 
degree murder. Defendant has not and cannot indicate a rational 
basis in the evidence upon which the jury could have legally 
acquitted him of the included offense of manslaughter and 
convicted him of the additional lesser included offense of 
negligent homicide. 
At trial, the State presented evidence that defendant 
deliberately pointed a .22 caliber rifle at the victim's head and 
fired approximately two shots, one of which was fatal (T. at 478-
84). After shooting the victim, defendant turned toward the 
State's witness, Lewis Sudweeks, and stated, "I'll have all you 
bastards in a pile before the night's over" (T. at 483-85, 547-
48). This evidence demonstrates defendant's knowledge of the 
risk of death, if not an actual intent to kill. See Standiford, 
769 P.2d at 254 (noting that 107 stab wounds indicated at least a 
17 knowledge of the risk of death). 
As part of his defense to the charge of second degree 
murder, defendant presented evidence of his intoxication the 
night of the shooting which resulted in an alleged "alcohol 
17 
The jury was properly instructed on the elements of both 
murder in the second degree and reckless manslaughter (see Jury 
Instructions # 11, 17, 18). 
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blackout" (T. at 672). During closing argument, defense counsel 
argued that defendant's intoxication was a factor for the jury to 
consider in deciding between second degree murder and 
manslaughter (Transcript of closing argument, March 30, 1990 
18 [hereinafter C.A.] at 41-42), Although defendant also attacked 
Sudweeks's credibility and the quality of the police 
investigation, he presented no additional evidence to suggest 
that he was unaware of the risk of death from mishandling and/or 
firing a .22 caliber rifle. 
As previously noted, voluntary intoxication may negate 
the mens rea of murder in the second degree; however, it does not 
negate the culpable mental state of either recklessness or 
negligence. Standiford, 769 P.2d at 265 (citing Utah Code Ann. § 
76-2-306 (1990)).19 "[I]ntoxication, even when sufficient to 
negate a culpable mental state, does not absolve a person from 
all criminal liability." Id. at 266. Thus, although the jury 
acquitted defendant of second degree murder because of 
intoxication, it could not have similarly acquitted defendant of 
the lesser included offense of manslaughter for which the 
18 
The jury was properly instructed concerning evidence of 
defendant's intoxication (see Jury Instruction # 19). 
19 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306 provides: 
Voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense 
to a criminal charge unless such intoxication 
negates the existence of the mental state 
which is an element of the offense; however, 
if recklessness or criminal negligence 
establishes an element of an offense and the 
actor is unaware of the risk because of 
voluntary intoxication, his unawareness is 
immaterial in a prosecution for that offense. 
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culpable mental state is recklessness. State v. Royballf 710 
P.2d 168, 170 (Utah 1985) (voluntary intoxication does not 
absolve a defendant of criminal responsibility for reckless 
criminal acts); State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985) 
(where the requisite mens rea of the manslaughter charge is 
recklessness, court held that evidence of defendant's alcoholic 
blackout was immaterial). Defendant presented no additional 
evidence to demonstrate that he was somehow unaware of the risk 
of death from mishandling a .22 caliber rifle. Thus, in light of 
section 76-2-306, defendant has not demonstrated a rational basis 
in the evidence upon which the jury could have legitimately 
acquitted him of the included offense of manslaughter. 
Therefore, defendant cannot meet the second prong of the Baker 
standard and the trial court properly denied his requested 
negligent homicide instruction. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AT TRIAL. 
Defendant, who was charged with the offense of second 
degree murder and ultimately found guilty of the lesser included 
offense of manslaughter, appears to assert that he was denied the 
effective assistance of counsel at trial because his trial 
counsel failed to; (1) conduct an adequate investigation to 
20 
The trial court's manslaughter instructions borrowed the 
statutory language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-205 (1990): 
Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if 
the actor recklessly causes the death of 
another. 
(Jury Instructions #11, 18). 
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determine whether defendant was a secretor and to attack the 
State's failure to have the State's witness, Lewis Sudweeks, 
similarly tested; (2) attack an alleged inconsistency between the 
State's theory of the case as presented at the preliminary 
hearing and the theory ultimately presented at trial; (3) 
adequately impeach Sudweeks's testimony; (4) point out that an 
alleged "substantial" rainstorm "may have obliterated" evidence 
and (5) call certain witnesses who may have testified regarding 
defendant's "positive mental attitude" the day of the shooting 
(Br. of App. at 5-13)• Defendant levels these allegations with 
absolutely no discussion of the defense actually presented by 
trial counsel or how that defense was either deficient or 
prejudicial. 
A defendant who raises a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel must show both that counsel rendered a 
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and that a 
reasonable probability exists that but for counsel's deficient 
performance, the result of the trial would have been different. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); State v. Carter, 
776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 
(Utah 1986). A "[d]efendant must prove that specific, identified 
acts or omissions fall outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance. The claim may not be speculative, but must 
be a demonstrative realityf.]" Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. And, the 
deficient performance must be so prejudicial as to "to undermine 
confidence in the reliability of the verdict." Id. 
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Here, defendant fails to meet either the deficient 
performance prong or the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. 
As to his claim regarding counsel's failure to determine whether 
or not he was a secretor and to attack the State's failure to 
have Sudweeks similarly tested, defendant fails to identify how 
counsel's conduct was deficient, nor does he articulate how it 
was prejudicial beyond his speculative, unsupported assertion 
that it was a "crucial fact" that "could have been pointed out to 
the jury in order to separate" him "from the site where the 
rifles were recovered." Defendant further asserts that "[i]f Mr. 
Sudweeks was tested for secretor status, the results could have 
established substantial reasonable doubt in this case" (Br. of 
21 App. at 8). Even assuming defense counsel could have 
introduced evidence that defendant was a secretor, it cannot 
reasonably be argued that defendant's case was prejudiced as a 
22 
result. The jury was presented with additional, significant 
and substantial evidence connecting defendant to his discarded 
rifles which were discovered by following a track determined to 
Defendant speculates that because 85% "of the male population 
of the United States has a physiological characteristic of being 
a secretor," and because "no ABO antigen activity was present on 
the cigarette" butt found near defendant's rifles, his trial 
counsel may have been able to show that defendant had not smoked 
the cigarette butt, if defendant had been tested, and found to be 
a secretor. 
22 
Defendant vaguely asserts that his trial counsel did not 
inform him of the "cigarette butt analysis" or other "forensic 
reports." Notwithstanding the fact that there is no record 
support for defendant's assertion, he fails to identify how 
counsel's performance was deficient, and does not articulate how 
it was prejudicial beyond speculating that had the information 
been shared, "the trial outcome would likely have been different" 
(Br. of App. at 11). 
-23-
have been made by defendant's boots to the crest of a small hill 
overlooking the scene where searchers also discovered defendant's 
cigarette lighter and a pack of Marlboro cigarettes of the type 
defendant smoked (T. at 174-87, 234, 285, 314-16, 438-39). 
Defendant next asserts that the State's theory of the 
case as presented at the preliminary hearing differed from the 
theory ultimately presented at trial (Br. of App. at 8-11). As 
before, defendant fails to identify how this alleged 
inconsistency rendered his trial counsel's performance deficient, 
nor does he articulate how it was prejudicial beyond making 
wholly speculative and unsupported assertions (Br. of App. at 9-
10). In support of his argument defendant relies solely on two 
completely unsubstantiated sketches of the "preliminary hearing 
scenario" and the "trial scenario" as viewed by defendant's wife 
which, although attached to his brief, are not part of the record 
on appeal. It is well settled that this Court cannot consider 
matters outside of the record. State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296, 297 
(Utah 1986); State v. Bingham, 684 P.2d 43, 46 (Utah 1984). 
According to defendant, the State's theory at the 
preliminary hearing was that the victim had been shot "from some 
short distance from his body and that two .22 caliber casings, 
also found a short distance from Mr. Kile's body, were most 
likely the casings connected to the fatal shot" (Br. of App. at 
8). At trial, defendant asserts the "State changed its theory by 
moving the truck and relying on the second pair of cartridges as 
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having been connected to the fatal shot" (Br. of App. at 9). 
Contrary to defendant's apparent assertion, at no time, either at 
the preliminary hearing or at trial, was the State's theory of 
defendant's guilt tied to the location of any particular .22 
caliber shell casing relative to the location of the victim's 
body (P.H. at 34-37A and T. 163-68, 201-08). Moreover, neither 
the preliminary hearing transcript nor the trial transcript 
support defendant's allegations which appear to wholly ignore the 
testimony of the State Medical Examiner, Dr. Grey, who testified 
at both the preliminary hearing and at trial that the fatal shot 
could not have been fired at close range (P.H. at 57; T. at 567). 
Nonetheless, defendant asserts that while the .22 
caliber shell casings discovered by Deputy Brewer approximately 
10 to 15 feet away from the victim may have been consistent with 
Dr. Grey's findings, they are inconsistent with the pictures 
drawn by his wife (Br. of App. at 10). Relying solely on these 
wholly speculative and unsubstantiated sketches depicting the 
preliminary hearing and trial as viewed by his wife, defendant 
asserts that "it becomes almost certain that these 'second' 
casings represent the fatal shot or shots" and that Sudweeks 
"implicated himself at the preliminary hearing because he did not 
know of the FBI test results on the 'second' pair of casings. By 
The "second pair of cartridges" referred to by defendant 
appear to be the two .22 caliber shell casings discovered by 
Deputy Brewer the night of the shooting approximately ten to 15 
feet south and west of the bloodstain created by the victim's 
head wound. Although these particular casings had not been 
analyzed by the FBI prior to the preliminary hearing, they had 
been analyzed by the time of trial and were determined to have 
been fired from defendant's .22 caliber rifle. 
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the time of trial, Sudweeks had to move the truck to continue to 
shift the blame to the Defendant, and he did" (Br. of App. at 
24 10). Although defendant attempts to support his allegations by 
attacking the consistency of Sudweeks's testimony between the 
preliminary hearing and trial, he fails to cite to any specific 
instance of Sudweeks's inconsistency (with reference to the 
location of the truck or the parties involved) in the record, 
25 
which wholly fails to support his allegations. Defendant's 
Totally lacking in record support for his claims, defendant 
asserts that Sudweeks "told two substantially different versions 
of the facts, [taking] advantage of the tie between the .22 
caliber rifle and both pairs of shell casings" (Br. of App. at 
9). According to defendant, Sudweeks's alleged inconsistency is 
of "vital importance" to his case because "Dr. Gr[e]y, the 
medical examiner[,] who did not testify at the preliminary 
hearing, testified at trial that the fatal shot had come from 
more than three feet away" from the victim's body (Br. of App. at 
9). However, as previously noted, and contrary to defendant's 
assertions, Dr. Grey did testify at the preliminary hearing and 
his testimony there was entirely consistent with his testimony 
at trial (P.H. at 51-70; T. at 565-94). At both proceedings Dr. 
Grey testified that the cause of death was a gunshot wound to the 
head (P.H. at 59; T. at 568). He further testified that it was 
not possible to determine the exact range from which the fatal 
shot was fired, which could have been fired from anywhere within 
an indeterminate range of from 5 to 50 feet, but not less than 
three feet from the victim (P.H. at 57; T. at 567). 
25 
Defendant further asserts that his trial counsel failed to 
preserve alleged inconsistencies in the State's theory through 
diagrams, visual exhibits or verbal description which "made it 
almost impossible to convincingly impeach" Sudweeks's testimony 
implicating defendant as the shooter, or to "adequately describe 
the prejudice suffered. . . ." (Br. of App. at 10-11). In 
addition, defendant notes that his trial counsel did not obtain 
any "expert testimony on forensic medicine to discuss the angles 
of shots in view of the two inconsistent theories offered by the 
State" (Br. of App. at 12). However, as previously noted, 
defendant fails to point to any specific inconsistencies in the 
record. Moreover, Sudweeks testified consistently both at the 
preliminary hearing and at trial that he saw defendant shoot Kile 
from his vantage point behind the driver's side door of 
defendant's truck, that defendant was standing in front of the 
truck, and that Kile was standing south and east of the truck, 
near the Henrie gate (P.H. at 102-05, 139-49; T. at 478-82). 
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speculative assertions together with his lack of record support 
simply fail to demonstrate either deficient performance by his 
trial counsel or prejudice to his defense. 
Defendant further attacks the adequacy of his trial 
counsel's impeachment of Sudweeks's testimony on the ground that 
counsel "failed to adequately investigate the relationship 
between David Kile, Bobby Cox, and Lewis Sudweeks," and therefore 
"failed to point out an important motivation for Mr. Sudweeks 
rather than Mr. Day to be the person to shoot David Kile" (Br. of 
App. at 12). Again, defendant's bald assertion is totally devoid 
of record support. Contrary to defendant's allegation, his trial 
counsel fully investigated the alleged "affectionate" 
relationship between the victim, David Kile, and Sudweeks's 
apparent common law wife at the time of the shooting, Bobby Cox. 
Kile's relationship with Cox was brought out during trial through 
the testimony of defense witnesses, William L. Christiansen and 
Lori Franklin, who testified that they had observed Cox and Kile 
drinking together on several occasions (T. at 744-45, 766). 
Franklin further testified that she had observed affectionate 
acts between Cox and Kile including "kissing," "hugging," and 
"putting their hand on each other's legs" (T. at 772-786). 
Franklin also testified she had heard a conversation between Cox 
and Sudweeks during which Sudweeks called Kile a "low life" and 
stated "that somebody should give him a blanket party in the near 
future" (T. at 766). Defendant does not suggest what further 
investigation should or could have been conducted, nor does he 
mention what, if any, additional evidence could have been 
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presented. In light of the above, defendant's frivolous and 
unsupported allegations establish neither deficiency nor 
prejudice and are without merit. 
Relying on State v. Tempiin, 149 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 
(Utah 1990), defendant appears to further assert that his trial 
counsel was ineffective for not calling certain witnesses to 
testify at trial concerning his "positive mental state and good 
attitude" the morning of the shooting (Br. of App. at 12). 
However, there is simply no indication in the record that either 
Peggy Palmer, Pat Yero or Jim Willis would have testified 
concerning defendant's positive attitude the morning of August 
10, 1989 had they been called at trial. Moreover, defendant has 
not demonstrated how, in view of the overwhelming evidence 
against him, testimony regarding his alleged positive attitude 
would have had anything other than a negligible effect on the 
jury. Because defendant has not demonstrated either deficiency 
or prejudice, his claim of ineffectiveness is without merit. Id. 
at 17 n.26 (defendant did not meet burden of demonstrating there 
was a reasonable probability of a different result at trial where 
he failed to provide reviewing court with any evidence concerning 
what the witness would have testified to had he been called 
during trial). 
Finally, defendant asserts that his trial counsel was 
ineffective for failing to elicit testimony concerning an alleged 
rainstorm which "may have obliterated substantially important 
evidence" (Br. of App. at 7, 12-13). Again defendant's vague 
assertion is wholly lacking in record support. Although evidence 
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of a light rain was presented at the preliminary hearing, there 
is no indication in the record that any evidence was obliterated 
26 
as a result (P.H. at 29). Because defendant has failed to 
point to any specific, identified acts or omissions that fall 
outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance, 
his allegations of ineffectiveness are without merit. 
POINT III 
THE PROSECUTOR PROPERLY DISCUSSED THE 
EVIDENCE AND THE INFERENCES AND DEDUCTIONS 
ARISING THEREFROM DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT. 
Defendant asserts that the prosecutor misstated in 
closing argument the actual time period that Harold Morrill 
testified defendant was gone from his porch the night of the 
shooting. He further asserts that the prosecutor misstated in 
closing argument that the State's witness, Lewis Sudweeks, 
submitted to a blood alcohol test (Br. of App. at 13). A careful 
review of the record demonstrates that defendant's assertions of 
prosecutorial misconduct are without merit. 
In reviewing an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct, 
this Court must determine whether the prosecutor's remarks called 
the attention of the jury to matters "they would not be justified 
in considering in reaching the verdict and, if so, whether there 
is a reasonable likelihood" that the remarks "so prejudiced the 
jury that there would have been a more favorable result absent 
the misconduct." State v. Speerf 750 P.2d 186, 190 (Utah 1988); 
26 
Significantly, Sheriff Gottfredson testified that he marked 
the location of shell casings discovered the night of the 
shooting with his foot and that those markings still were present 
when the investigation was continued the following morning (T. at 
266). 
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State v, Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 559-61 (Utah 1987). In 
determining whether a remark is prejudicial the alleged 
misconduct must be viewed in light of the totality of the trial 
and the trial court's ruling on this matter will not be 
overturned absent an abuse of discretion. Speer, 750 P.2d at 
190. 
As a general rulef counsel for each side has 
considerable latitude and may discuss fully from their viewpoints 
the evidence and the inferences and deductions arising therefrom 
in closing argument. Tillman# 750 P.2d at 560 (citations 
omitted). The prosecutor's closing argument in this case was 
properly within this latitude and defendant has not demonstrated 
that he called the attention of the jurors to matters outside the 
recordf nor has defendant demonstrated that the alleged 
misstatements so prejudiced the jury that there was a strong 
likelihood of a more favorable result absent the prosecutor's 
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remarks. During the course of closing argument, the prosecutor 
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Moreover, the jurors were instructed that argument by the 
attorneys was not evidence in the case: 
You must not consider as evidence, any 
statement of counsel made during this trial; 
however, if counsel for the parties stipulate 
you will regard that fact as being 
conclusively proved. 
As to any question to which an objection was 
sustained, you must not speculate as to what 
the answer might have been or as to the 
reason for the objection. 
You must not consider any evidence that was 
rejected or any evidence that was stricken. 
A question is not evidence, and may be 
considered only as it supplies meaning to the 
-30-
made the following observation concerning the testimony of Harold 
Morrill: 
Harold Morrill didn't testify that Lew Day 
was gone 20 to 30 minutes. That's not a 
correct statement of the evidence. What he 
said was, "I left him (Sudweeks) on the 
porch, went in and took care of my children. 
When I came out, he was gone." He didn't 
know if he (Sudweeks) left 30 seconds 
before— 
(C.A. at 78). At this point in the prosecutor's closing 
argument, defense counsel objected, asserting that Harold Morrill 
had actually testified that defendant was gone 20 to 30 minutes 
(C.A. at 78). The trial court overruled defense counsel's 
objection, stating that "[t]he jury heard the testimony[;] [t]hey 
can rely on their joint memory" (C.A. at 79). The prosecutor 
then continued his argument as follows: 
Harold Morrill talked about what he did. He 
went in the bathroom, took care of his little 
girl, got her out of the tub, put her pajamas 
on, got the boy out, wrapped him in a towel, 
and walked back out. That's all he said he 
could remember doing. 
He said, "I did not look at my clock. Any 
estimate, any time I give is an estimate. 
That's what I did. I don't know when 
Sudweeks left. All I know is when I come 
out, he was gone." 
Now that could have been 30 seconds. It 
could have been 5 minutes. The evidence 
isn't clear on that. But it is clear that 
when he came back, he was scared to death. 
(C.A. at 79). Although defendant claims the prosecutor's 
statements were erroneous, his assertion is not supported by a 
Cont. answer. 
(Jury Instruction #5). 
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review of Harold Morrill's testimony at trial (T. at 617-623; a 
copy of Harold Morrill's testimony is attached hereto as Addendum 
C). Harold Morrill was not sure how long Sudweeks was gone from 
his porch (T. at 618-23). After speaking briefly with Sudweeks, 
Harold went inside the Morrill home to retrieve his daughter from 
the bathtub; when he came back outside, Sudweeks was gone. (T. at 
618). Approximately 10 to 15 minutes later, Harold's father, 
Dale Morrill, arrived home and Harold began telling him about 
Sudweeks's first visit (T. at 618). Shortly thereafter, Sudweeks 
returned (T. at 618). On cross-examination, Harold agreed with 
defense counsel that it was possible Sudweeks could have been 
gone for approximately 20 to 30 minutes (T. at 620). However, at 
no time did Harold Morrill emphatically state that he was certain 
defendant was gone from the porch for 20 to 30 minutes and no 
less; rather, that time period was merely a possibility. 
Sudweeks testified that he was gone less than 10 minutes (T. at 
559). Based on the foregoing testimony, it cannot reasonably be 
argued that the prosecutor misstated the evidence, specifically 
the testimony of Harold Morrill. Rather, the prosecutor's 
comments amounted to nothing more than the wholly appropriate 
drawing of inferences and deductions from ambiguous testimony. 
Defendant's additional allegation of prosecutorial 
misconduct is similarly unsupported by a careful review of the 
record. Defendant asserts that the prosecutor improperly stated 
that Lewis Sudweeks had been given a blood alcohol test, when in 
fact he had not (Br. of App. at 13). However, defendant failed 
to object to this alleged misstatement at trial; therefore, he is 
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barred from raising it on appeal. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 
1141, 1147 (Utah 1989). Assuming this Court decides to address 
defendant's argument, the following analysis is provided by the 
State. 
The prosecutor stated in pertinent part as follows: 
All the evidence in this case stacks the 
intoxication level like this: Evan is the 
most drunk, Lew Day is the least. All the 
witnesses, all the tests, they wanted us to 
test Evan Wiltshire. What would that change 
in this case if Evan Wiltshire had been 
tested and shown to have an obvious high high 
level of intoxication? 
If you test Lew—we tested Lew Sudweeks. Lew 
Sudweeks had a high level of intoxication in 
between Lew Day and Evan Wiltshire. Those 
are smokescreens that will not help you in 
your deliberation. 
(C.A. at 80-81). Although the prosecutor's observation was 
clearly prefaced by an "If," the comment is admittedly ambiguous. 
However, even assuming the prosecutor misstated the evidence, the 
effect of a such a misstatement was likely negligible in view of 
the overwhelming evidence that all four men had been drinking 
heavily. In any event, defendant has failed to demonstrate that 
the prosecutor's remarks prejudiced him such that there was a 
likelihood of a more favorable result. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT'S ALLEGATIONS OF IMPROPER 
JUROR/WITNESS CONTACT HAVE NOT BEEN PRESERVED 
FOR REVIEW BY THIS COURT; ALTERNATIVELY, 
REVERSAL ON THAT GROUND IS NOT WARRANTED. 
On appeal to this Court, defendant appears to assert 
that there was improper contact between the State's witness, 
Deputy Robert Nalwalker, who also assisted in the trial 
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proceedings, and juror Grover Smith (Br. of App. at 14). 
However, in denying defendant's motion for new trial, the trial 
court expressly found that defense counsel had specifically 
waived the issue of alleged improper juror/witness contact (R. at 
416-18). 
During a lunch recess in the course of defendant's 
trial March 26-30, 1990, Deputy Nalwalker observed juror Smith 
emerge from the men's restroom (R. at 264). Aware that the other 
jurors had already been taken to lunch by court personnel, Deputy 
Nalwalker approached Smith and asked him to wait, stating that he 
would ask the judge what to do about Smith's being left behind 
(R. at 264-265, 308). After consulting with the judge, Deputy 
Nalwalker informed Smith that the judge had instructed him 
(Nalwalker) and the county clerk (who was serving as bailiff) to 
drive Smith to the cafe where the other jurors were eating (R. at 
265, 308-09). Deputy Nalwalker, the bailiff and juror Smith then 
drove, "without conversing," approximately one or two miles to 
Dayna's Cafe where Smith joined the other jurors (R. at 265; 308-
09; copies of affidavits filed by Deputy Nalwalker and Grover 
Smith are attached hereto as Addendum D). 
In support of defendant's motion for new trial filed 
May 23, 1990, defense counsel, David Blackwell, filed an 
affidavit with the trial court stating that he had observed two 
conversations between juror Smith and Deputy Nalwalker during a 
trial recess (R. at 258-59). However, at a hearing on the matter 
held June 7, 1990, defense counsel, Marcus Taylor, advised the 
trial court that he and Blackwell had discussed the matter and 
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decided not to raise any objection to the contact between Smith 
and Nalwalker (R. at 416). In a memorandum decision denying 
defendant's new trial motion, the trial court expressly found 
that the issue of alleged improper contact between Deputy 
Nalwalker and Smith had been waived: 
Defense counsel were aware of the contact in 
question and made a decision not raise any 
question in relation thereto. The Court 
concludes this constituted a waiver. It 
would not be appropriate for defense counsel 
to invite error, albeit by silence, and then 
to rely thereon. State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 
1275, 1285 (Utah 1989). 
(R. at 416-18; see Addendum A). In State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 
1275 (Utah 1989), relied upon by the trial court, defense counsel 
specifically waived any prejudice resulting from conversation 
between a juror and a witness and then subsequently attempted to 
assert that contact was prejudicial on appeal. In determining 
that the issue of alleged improper juror witness contact had been 
"affirmatively, knowingly, and intentionally" waived, the Utah 
Supreme Court held that "'invited error' (if there were any) 'is 
procedurally unjustified and viewed with disfavor, especially 
where ample opportunity has been afforded to avoid such a 
result'" Id. at 1285 (citing Tillman, 750 P.2d at 560-61). 
Similarly, because defendant's trial counsel were aware of the 
contact between juror Smith and Deputy Nalwalker during trial and 
took no action to challenge the alleged impropriety at that time, 
this Court may properly decline to review defendant's allegation 
of improper juror witness contact on the ground of waiver. 
Notwithstanding defendant's apparent waiver, assuming 
this Court determines to reach the merits of his allegation, the 
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trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's 
new trial motion and/or his request for an evidentiary hearing 
because the brief contact between Deputy Nalwalker and juror 
Smith was incidental and inconsequential, raising no presumption 
op 
of prejudice. ° State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 909 (Utah 1990). 
Contrary to defendant's apparent assertion, the facts do not 
present an improper "conversational contact[]" between a juror 
and a trial witness or court personnel, ^d. Cf:. Logan City v. 
Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (conversation between 
bailiff and juror concerning the "sensitive subject of 
sentencing" amounted to more than a brief, incidental contact, 
triggering a presumption of prejudice and bailiff's testimony, 
standing alone, was not sufficient to show that the jury had not 
in fact been prejudiced). In the present case, as in Jonas, "no 
'conversation' took place, in the normal sense of an 'oral 
exchange of sentiments, observations, opinions [or] ideas.'" Id. 
(citation omitted). Deputy Nalwalker merely approached Smith and 
asked him to wait while he inquired of the judge what to do about 
the fact that court personnel had already taken the other jurors 
Although the trial court considered the issue of alleged 
improper juror witness contact waived, for the apparent purpose 
of refuting the allegations of impropriety in defendant's new 
trial motion, the trial court found that, assuming a presumption 
was legitimately raised, the State adequately rebutted the 
presumption with the filing of affidavits by Deputy Nalwalker and 
juror Smith explaining the incidental and inconsequential nature 
of the contact (R. at 416-18). It is the State's position that 
it was not necessary for the trial court to assume that a 
presumption of prejudice was raised in denying defendant's 
motion. As discussed with greater detail in the body of this 
point, the contact between Deputy Nalwalker and juror Smith was 
simply not an improper "conversational contact" sufficient to 
raise a presumption of prejudice. 
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to lunch. Thus, although Deputy Nalwalker's initial approach of 
juror Smith was not authorized by the trial court, it was within 
the scope of his duty to assist in the trial proceedings and 
cannot reasonably be characterized as "verbal contact beyond mere 
civilit[y]." .Id. at 909. Furthermore, Deputy Nalwalker's second 
approach of juror Smith was clearly authorized by the trial court 
(R. at 417). When he returned a few moments later, Deputy 
Nalwalker merely informed juror Smith that the judge had 
requested that he (Nalwalker) and the bailiff drive Smith to the 
cafe where the other jurors were eating lunch (R. at 265, 308-
09). Deputy Nalwalker, the bailiff and juror Smith then drove, 
"without conversing," approximately one or two miles to Dayna's 
Cafe where Smith joined the other jurors (R. at 265; 308-09). 
Based on the foregoing, it is clear that Deputy 
Nalwalker did not engage Smith in conversation or otherwise 
conduct himself in a manner which would have had the affect of 
breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly effect Smith's 
judgment as to Nalwalker's credibility. Id. at 908; £f. State v. 
Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 279-80 (Utah 1985) (conversation concerning 
personal incident between witness who was arresting officer as 
well as an eyewitness held sufficient to breed an improper sense 
of familiarity). The incidental nature of the initial contact, 
the subsequent authorization by the trial court, the presence of 
the bailiff and the complete lack of conversation, substantive or 
otherwise, demonstrate that defendant's allegations of improper 
contact are without merit and need not be reviewed by this Court. 
-37-
POINT V 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT 
DEFENDANT OF THE INCLUDED OFFENSE OF 
MANSLAUGHTER. 
In points V and VI of his brief, defendant appears to 
allege that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of the 
included offense of manslaughter. However, he levels this 
allegation with absolutely no discussion of the evidence actually 
presented or how that evidence was deficient. Rather, defendant 
appears to attack the lack of additional evidence which might 
possibly have implicated someone else as the shooter. He appears 
to further allege that certain evidence introduced at trial could 
29 
not have been in existence. 
The power of this Court to review a jury verdict 
challenged on the sufficiency of the evidence is "quite limited." 
State v. Mooref 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The 
evidence, along with the reasonable inferences from it, must be 
viewed in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. State v. 
Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S.Ct. 
1837 (1990). Thus, this Court requires defendants challenging 
the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal to marshal all the 
evidence in support of the jury's verdict and then demonstrate 
that even viewing it in the light most favorable to the verdict, 
the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. Moore, 802 
P.2d at 738-39 (adopting the "marshal the evidence" standard for 
Although defendant argues that Sheriff Gottfredson's markings 
indicating the location of certain shell casings were eliminated 
by rain, Sheriff Gottfredson testified that the markings were 
still present the morning after the alleged rain (T. at 266). 
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use in criminal appeals from jury verdicts where sufficiency of 
the evidence is at issue). Where, as here, the defendant has 
wholly failed to marshal the evidence, this Court need not and 
should not consider the challenge to its sufficiency. Id. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
this Court to affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this IQ day of March, 1991. 
PAUL VAN DAM 
Utah Attorney General 
RIAN DECKED 
Assistant Attorney General 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION IN RE 
POST-TRIAL MOTIONS 
Case No. 89-CR-19 
I N T R O D U C T I O N 
Subsequent to the trial and the pronouncement of sentence 
herein, the Defendant filed a Motion for a new trial. As grounds 
the Motion alleged: 
1. Improper conversation between witness and 
juror. 
2. Improper conversation between witness and 
prospective juror. 
3. Improper conversation between juror and Clerk 
official. 
4. New exculpatory evidence. 
5. Newly-discovered evidence (victimfs shirt). 
6. Newly-discovered evidence (lead fragment). 
The wife of the Defendant subsequently filed an affidavit 
calling into question the adequacy of representation by defense 
counsel David Blackwell and Marcus Taylor of Richfield, Utah. 
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This resulted in a motion to withdraw and for appointment of 
substitute counsel for Defendant. The motion to withdraw was 
granted, and with approval of Defendant and his wife, as well as 
the County, the Court appointed James L. Shumate of Cedar City, 
Utah to proceed with representation. 
Other post-sentencing motions were also filed, and at the 
time hereof there remains pending before the Court the following: 
1. Two State's Motions to strike defense 
affidavits or portions thereof which do not comply with 
the Rules of Evidence; and further, to strike, naked or 
unsupported factual allegations which appear in defense 
Motions or Memoranda. 
2. A defense Motion for the appointment of a 
private investigator. 
3. A defense Motion for an evidentiary hearing. 
4. The defense Motion for a new trial. 
Both sides have filed numerous affidavits which will be 
discussed hereafter. Most of the affidavits are not 
contradictory. With only one or two exceptions, the affidavits 
filed by the State contain clarifying, explanatory or 
supplemental information not contradicting the factual 
allegations contained in the defense affidavits. 
The four Motions came before the Court at Junction, Utah, on 
Monday, July 30, 1990. At that time counsel stipulated that the 
affidavits on file could be treated by the Court as proffered and 
accepted proof reflecting the actual testimony which the affiants 
would give (subject to the Rules of Evidence) should they be 
called to testify, and that the Court could make findings of fact 
based thereon. 
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With the foregoing as a backdrop the Court will proceed to 
consider the merits of the four pending Motions, 
I* MOTION TO STRIKE 
Various defense pleadings as well as affidavits contain 
hearsay, rumor, innuendo, speculation and assumptions. As such 
the State's motions to strike may be well taken. Nevertheless 
the Court has determined to deny the motions and to evaluate both 
supported and unsupported allegations and to leave the same in 
the record for purposes of appellate review. In this regard the 
Court gives an expansive construction to the recent Supreme Court 
ruling in State v. Hadfield, 128 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (1990) which is 
discussed more extensively hereafter. 
II. MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF PRIVATE INVESTIGATOR 
Defendant seeks appointment of a private investigator for 
the purpose of interviewing Ms. Bobbie Cox and Mr. Bo-Jon Reef. 
The stated purpose of the investigation would be to inquire as to 
an alleged post-trial statement by State's witness Lewis Sudweeks 
to the effect, "Looks like I got away with another one". 
The record reveals that subsequent to the trial herein, the 
defense hired a private investigator by the name of Blaine 
Pectol. The results of Pectol's investigation are contained in 
two reports prepared by him and filed herein. The reports 
indicate that Pectol conducted numerous interviews including 
interviews of Ms. Bobbie Cox and Mr. Bo-Jon Reef and further 
investigated the crime scene, reviewed all of the evidence in the 
trial and generally investigated post-trial rumors, suggestions 
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and second-guessing. 
The record further discloses post-trial investigation by 
Piute County Sheriff Brent Gottfredson which he conducted as a 
matter of public duty and as a result of the reports, accusations 
and matters brought to his attention by the Defendants wife or 
by the various post-trial pleadings filed by the defense. He 
likewise interviewed Ms. Bobbie Cox to whom the statement, "Looks 
like I got away with another one," was allegedly made. 
The defense theory that the perpetrator of the crime was 
State witness Lewis Sudweeks was advanced at trial and rejected 
by the jury. Additional evidence thereof would be cumulative and 
not new. The post-trial investigation by the private 
investigator and the County Sheriff have failed to add any 
credibility to this defense theory. The statement in question 
purportedly made by the said witness comes to the Court in the 
form of hearsay, twice and thrice removed, without any 
corroboration or contextual framework. It is a statement which 
by nature is susceptible of different meanings and defense 
counsel in Open Court at the time of the hearing hereon candidly 
acknowledged that he could not project the results of additional 
inquiry if a private investigator were appointed. 
It appears to the Court that the defense is seeking to 
embark on a sort of "fishing expedition" stimulated principally 
by rumor, innuendo, speculation and wishful thinking. The 
defense is unable to point to clear definitive evidence, but 
rather to the possibility that something might be discovered. 
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Since this arises in a post-conviction setting, the timing seems 
inappropriate. 
The record further discloses that prior to the trial herein 
the attorneys who represented Defendant through trial# to-wit: 
Marcus Taylor and David Blackwell, conducted considerable 
investigatory work; that they traveled to Marysvale, Junction, 
Circleville, Panguitch and Escalante and interviewed numerous 
witnesses, including roost of those whom the defense now would 
call at an evidentiary hearing in support of its Motion for a new 
trial and particularly one Bobbie Cox. 
The Court is satisfied that proper investigatory work has 
already been conducted in this case, both before and after the 
trial; that it has been conducted not only by the office of the 
County Sheriff but also by defense counsel and a private 
investigator hired for the defense. All three have interviewed 
the said Bobbie Cox at least once and such interviews have been 
conducted both before and after the trial. 
The Court is not satisfied that appointment of a private 
investigator is warranted or would be productive and accordingly 
the motion therefor is denied. 
III. MOTION FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
The Court has considered the Motion for an evidentiary 
hearing in light of the recent decision in State v. Hadfield, 
supra. That decision is not entirely clear as to the quality of 
evidence which must be laid before the Court as a foundational 
premise for an evidentiary hearing. It seems to suggest that 
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"proffered evidence" or "allegations about new evidence", if they 
are sufficiently persuasive, may be adequate even though they 
fail to comply with the Utah Rules of Evidence. The opinion does 
make clear that the Utah Rules of Evidence would govern at the 
evidentiary hearing, but strict adherence when evaluating whether 
or not to convene the hearing appears not to be mandated. 
Based on the foregoing construction of the Hadfield 
decision, the Court determined not to strike the naked, factual 
allegations which appear in various pleadings filed by the 
defense and further determined to leave intact the various 
defense affidavits even though in some instances they involve 
hearsay, once, twice or thrice removed, as well as opinion, 
speculation and conjecture which fail to conform to the Rules of 
Evidence. 
In a Memorandum filed with the Court the defense has listed 
nineteen witnesses it would propose to call at an evidentiary 
hearing and the testimony that would be given by each. The names 
of the witnesses, a brief indication of their testimony and the 
Court's response follow: 
1. Blaine Pectol, a private investigator, would purportedly 
testify that he was hired by a friend of Defendant's to conduct a 
post-trial investigation. He reviewed all of the trial evidence, 
located a small lead fragment in a gatepost at the crime scene 
which had not previously been discovered, and interviewed a 
number of witnesses some of whom are listed hereafter as 
potential witnesses at an evidentiary hearing. The specific 
testimony of the potential witnesses is summarized hereafter. 
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As to the proffered evidence from Pectol, the Court 
determines as follows: 
(1) The purported testimony of Blaine Pectol 
is essentially hearsay sometimes thrice removed with 
the exception of testimony about the location of the 
metal fragment in the gatepost at the crime scene. 
(2) The State's evidence, as depicted on 
Exhibit #2, indicated that Defendant fired two shots at 
the victim with the gatepost in the background. 
(3) If the metal fragment located in the 
gatepost was fired from the Defendant's weapon such 
would be consistent with and corroborative of the 
State's evidence. If not, it has no apparent 
relevancy. 
(4) The Pectol testimony as indicated by his 
reports would be cumulative of theories already 
advanced by the defense during trial and fails to shed 
any appreciable additional light thereon. 
(5) The information contained in the Pectol 
reports even if produced through proper witnesses is 
not such as to render a different result probable on 
retrial. 
The Court also notes that at the hearing hereon there was 
admitted by stipulation a report from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation indicating that the lead fragment found in the 
gatepost could not be connected to the victim nor to the 
Defendant's weapon. As such it appears irrelevant. 
2. George Steven Birdf is expected to testify that Deputy 
Sheriff Robert Nalwalker made statements about the evidence in a 
cafe prior to commencement of the trial. 
With respect to the proffered testimony of George Steven 
Bird the Court determines: 
(1) Bird testified at the trial and any 
evidence he could give is not newly-discovered as and 
8 
for the reason that it could have been discovered with 
reasonable diligence prior to trial. 
(2) Assuming the occurrence of the events 
described by Bird there is no showing that they had any 
impact on the trial. 
3. Vickie Barton would purportedly testify that prior to 
the trial she heard Bo-Jon Reef state that he heard State witness 
Lewis Sudweeks make threats against the victim if the latter did 
not stay away from Sudweeks1 girlfriend Bobbie Cox. 
With respect to the proffered testimony of Vickie Barton, 
the Court determines as follows: 
(1) The proffered Vickie Barton testimony 
would be inadmissable as hearsay twice or thrice 
removed. 
(2) Even if admitted, the testimony is 
cumulative of a theory already advanced at trial by the 
defense. 
(3) The testimony of Vickie Barton is not 
newly discovered and with reasonable diligence could 
have been discovered prior to the trial. 
(4) The testimony of Vickie Barton is not 
such as would render a different result probable on 
retrial. 
4. Bo-Jon Reef would purportedly testify that he heard 
State witness Lewis Sudweeks make threats against the defendant 
and also that the victim was having a love affair with Bobbie 
Cox. 
With respect to the proffered testimony of Bo-Jon Reef, the 
Court determines as follows: 
(1) Bo-Jon Reef was interviewed by Private 
Investigator Blaine Pectol. The information given Pectol 
does not support the claim regarding his testimony. 
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(2) There is an absence of any credible 
evidence before the Court which would indicate that Bo-
Jon Reef would testify in the manner indicated* 
(3) The purported testimony of Bo-Jon Reef 
even if admitted would be cumulative of a theory 
already advanced by defense at trial. 
(4) The testimony of Bo-Jon Reef is not 
newly discovered and with reasonable diligence could 
have been discovered prior to the trial. 
(5) The purported testimony of Bo-Jon Reef 
is not such as to render a different result probable on 
retrial. 
5. Grover Smith, who served as a jurorr would purportedly 
testify that the jury did not receive an express instruction on 
the right of the jury to find the Defendant innocent. 
With respect to the proffered testimony of Grover Smith, the 
Court determines as follows: 
(1) The testimony of Grover Smith 
regarding jury instructions would be 
irrelevant. 
(2) The jury instructions speak for 
themselves and their adequacy or inadequacy 
is a matter of law. 
6. Bill Christensen. who testified for the defense at 
trial, would purportedly testify that State witness Lewis 
Sudweeks, while under the influence of alcohol, stated to his 
girlfriend, Bobbie Cox, who later repeated it to Christensen, 
"Looks like I got away with another one,". Further, that 
Sudweeks and Cox had violent fights. Further, that Sudweeks told 
him the shirt belonging to the victim, along with a hat belonging 
to one Evan Wiltshire and gloves belonging to the Defendant 
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burned up in Sudweeks1 pickup truck* 
With respect to the purported testimony of Bill Christensen, 
the Court determines as follows: 
(1) The implication that the perpetrator of 
the crime was Lewis Sudweeks rather than the Defendant 
was advanced at trial and rejected by the jury. 
(2) Matters in relation to the victimfs 
shirt were raised and argued at trial along with 
questions regarding other items in the Defendants 
pickup, the impoundment and inventory thereof, etc. 
(3) The matter of fights between Lewis 
Sudweeks and Bobbie Cox was likewise a subject of 
evidence at trial. 
(4) The purported testimony of Bill 
Christensen is cumulative of evidence and theories 
already advanced by the defense at trial and are not 
such as to render a different result probable on 
retrial. 
7. Buddy Ross would purportedly testify that he heard 
Bobbie Cox in a fight with Lewis Sudweeks after the trial state 
that she knew that Lewis Sudweeks had killed David Kile. 
With respect to the proffered testimony of Buddy Ross, the 
Court determines as follows: 
(1) There is nothing in the record from 
which the Court can ascertain the basis under which the 
defense advances the purported testimony of Ross. 
There is no statement as to who talked with Ross or to 
whom Ross provided this information. 
(2) The expression of an opinion by Bobbie 
Cox regarding who committed the crime is not 
admissable. 
(3) Bobbie Cox has been interviewed before 
and after the trial by the private investigator and the 
County Sheriff and the interviews have not produced any 
evidence which corroborates or lends credibility to the 
purported testimony of Ross. 
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(4) The matters concerning which Ross would 
purportedly testify, even if property introduced in 
evidence, are cumulative of theories already advanced 
and rejected, and are not such as to render a different 
result probable on retrial. 
8. Lorie Franklin would purportedly testify that she had a 
threatening and intimidating contact with Lewis Sudweeks after 
the trial at which time Sudweeks reportedly said, "You did what 
you had to do; well, I did what I had to last summer". 
With regard to the proffered testimony of Lorie Franklin, 
the Court determines as follows: 
(1) Lorie Franklin was a witness for the 
defense at trial and gave testimony which called into 
question the credibility and veracity of Lewis Sudweeks 
and further cast him in a negative and derogatory 
light. 
(2) Though inappropriate, a post-trial 
intimidating and threatening confrontation between 
Sudweeks and Franklin is of limited if any relevancy. 
(3) The statement, "You did what you had to 
do; well, I did what I had to do last summer", is 
susceptible of different meanings and requires 
conjecture and speculation. 
(4) There is no evidence before the Court 
that would make clear the meaning of the alleged 
statement. 
(5) The defense effort to shift blame to 
State witness Lewis Sudweeks was clearly advanced at 
trial and rejected by the jury. 
(6) The Lorie Franklin testimony, even if 
properly admitted, is not such as would render a 
different result probable on retrial. 
9. Leland Millett. who served as a juror, would purportedly 
testify regarding the jury deliberations. There is nothing 
attributed to Millett that suggests any impropriety in the 
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deliberations or that seriously threatens the verdict. The 
purported testimony comes to the Court in the form of the notes 
of the private investigator, Blaine Pectol, regarding his 
telephone conference with Leland Millett. 
With regard to the proffered testimony of Leland Millett the 
Court determines as follows: 
(1) The information before the Court 
regarding Millet is entirely hearsay based on the 
Pectol report. 
(2) Even if the statements attributed to 
Millet were properly before the Court they would not 
form an adequate basis to upset the jury verdict. 
10. Bobbie Cox would purportedly testify that she is a 
live-in girlfriend of Lewis Sudweeks; that there are some 
discrepancies between the testimony of Sudweeks and things he has 
told her, e.g. what happened to the victim's clothing and the 
location of the Defendant's pickup along with other items which 
appear to have no relevancy at all to this case. 
With regard to the proffered testimony of Bobbie Cox the 
Court determines as follows: 
(1) The Court notes the absence of any 
indication that Bobbie Cox would offer evidence that 
Lewis Sudweeks was the perpetrator of the homicide. 
This is striking since the proffers from the other 
witnesses which implicate Sudweeks base such 
implication on statements purportedly made by or to 
Bobbie Cox. 
(2) The purported testimony advances defense 
theories which were rejected by the jury. 
(3) Bobbie Cox was interviewed by defense 
counsel before the trial and could have been called as 
a witness by either side. Evidence she could give 
would not be "newly discovered." 
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(4) The testimony of Bobbie Cox, if properly 
admitted, would be cumulative and not such as to render 
a different result probable on retrial. 
11. Larry John Norman would purportedly testify that prior 
to the homicide he heard Lewis Sudweeks threaten the life of the 
victim. 
With regard to the proffered testimony of Larry John Norman 
the Court determines as follows: 
(1) The purported testimony of Larry John 
Norman is directly contradictory to the information 
which he supplied the private investigator, Blaine 
Pectol, and the County Sheriff as reflected by the 
report of the former and affidavit of the latter. 
(2) The record reveals that Norman has been 
interviewed several times both before and after the 
trial and any evidence he could now give could have 
been discovered with reasonable diligence prior to the 
trial and would not qualify as "newly-discovered". 
(3) Even if Norman were to testify as 
purported, such testimony would be cumulative of a 
theory already advanced by the defense at trial. 
(4) Even if Norman were to testify as 
purported, such testimony is not likely to render a 
different result probable on retrial. 
12. Linda King would purportedly testify that Lewis 
Sudweeks had made threats against the victim if he didn't stay 
away from Bobbie Cox. 
With regard to the proffered testimony of Linda King, the 
Court determines as follows: 
(1) The basis for the proffer on King is an 
interview conducted by the private investigator Pectol. 
In the interview King states that her source is Larry 
John Norman whose proffered testimony is summarized 
immediately above. The statements given the private 
investigator and the Sheriff by Larry John Norman 
contradict the information King claims to have received 
from Norman. 
14 
(2) Even if the King testimony could somehow 
be elevated to a level of admissability it would be 
cumulative of a theory already advanced by the defense 
at trial and rejected by the jury. 
(3) The testimony of Linda King even if 
properly admitted would not be such as to render a 
different result probable on retrial. ' 
13. Terry Allen Kile, brother of the victim, filed an 
affidavit stating that after the homicide State witness Lewis 
Sudweeks delivered to him two articles of clothing which had 
belonged to the victim. He further indicated that Sudweeks had 
told him that he had placed a pack of cigarettes in a shirt 
pocket of the victim, but then realizing he was dead, removed the 
cigarettes. 
With respect to the affidavit of Terry Allen Kile, the Court 
determines as follows: 
(1) The affidavit of Terry Allen Kile 
contradicts information he purportedly gave the private 
investigator Pectol as set forth in the latter's 
report. He is alleged to have told the private 
investigator that he did not receive any clothing from 
Lewis Sudweeks. 
(2) The defense has already advanced at 
trial a theory concerning the presence or absence of 
clothing, as well as cigarettes and evidence relating 
thereto would be cumulative and not new. 
(3) Both Terry Kile and Lewis Sudweeks 
testified at trial and the information concerning 
clothing and cigarettes would have been readily 
discoverable with reasonable diligence prior to the 
trial and could have been produced at the trial. 
Accordingly, such evidence is not "newly discovered". 
(4) Lewis Sudweeks was examined and cross-
examined extensively at trial regarding every detail of 
his account and any inconsistencies therein were the 
subject both of much evidence and argument. Additional 
evidence in this regard would be cumulative and not 
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such as would likely render a different result probable 
on retrial. 
14. Nancy Christensen would purportedly testify 
that she attended the trial on one day and observed 
jurors who fell asleep. She will also testify that 
Lewis Sudweeks has made inconsistent statements. 
With regard to the proffered testimony of Nancy Christensen, 
the Court determines as follows: 
(1) The Court takes judicial notice of all 
proceedings involving the jury in Open Court and Mrs. 
Christensen's purported testimony adds nothing thereto. 
(2) The Court finds no impropriety in the 
conduct of the jury in Open Court. 
(3) The theory of inconsistent statements by 
State witness Lewis Sudweeks was advanced and argued 
extensively by the defense at trial. 
(4) Nancy Christensen was at the trial and 
would have been available as a witness and any 
testimony she could give would not be "newly 
discovered". 
(5) There is nothing in the purported 
testimony of Mrs. Christensen which is likely to render 
a different result probable on retrial. 
15. Pat Yero, who was subpoenaed by the defense at trial, 
has filed two affidavits herein regarding alleged juror 
misconduct. Those affidavits are discussed elsewhere. A defense 
memorandum indicates that she would also testify that she saw a 
deputy sheriff talk with other witnesses after the Courtfs 
exclusionary order was entered. Further, she claims to have seen 
Lewis Sudweeks upstairs during the trial sitting outside the open 
courtroom door and listening to the testimony from inside the 
courtroom. 
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With regard to the proffered testimony of Pat Yero, the 
Court determines as follows: 
(1) The proffered testimony of Yero regard-
ing the conduct of witnesses is general and wholly 
lacking in specificity* There is no indication as to 
when, how long or substance. The Yero affidavits filed 
several months ago make no reference to the alleged 
problems now raised by proffer. 
(2) During the course of trial the Court 
frequently cautioned jurors, witnesses and members of 
the public and no violations or improprieties were 
reported to the Court. 
(3) Pat Yero as well as other persons named 
in Defendants Memorandum have previously submitted 
letters and materials to this Court evidencing their 
friendship with and support of Defendant. Some have 
also appeared as sureties on the Defendant's bail bond. 
While they have been liberal and conclusionary in their 
general criticism, none have come forward in a timely 
manner to identify with specificity any problem or 
impropriety in the conduct of the trial. 
(4) The Court has not received any indicat-
ion from counsel for either side or from any Court 
personnel which would tend to establish impropriety in 
the proceedings. 
(5) While the Court has accepted proffers in 
keeping with what it understands to be the spirit of 
the Hadfield decision, it is of the opinion that the 
proffers must allege specific facts which, if 
subsequently established at an evidentiary hearing, 
would warrant relief. The Court is of the opinion that 
it is not enough to "flock shoot" or to come forward 
months later and throw out some general accusations. 
16. Terry V. Mason would purportedly testify that she is 
the sister-in-law to the Defendant and that she was called as a 
witness by surprise. Further, she would testify that the Sheriff 
and his deputy had made inconsistent statements. 
With regard to the proffered testimony of Terry V. Mason, 
the Court determines as follows: 
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(1) Terry Mason was called as witness for 
the purpose of identifying a cigarette lighter belong-
ing to Defendant and after the Court had ruled that the 
Defendant's wife could not be called nor could the 
Sheriff testify as to identification of the lighter by 
the wife. 
(2) It was proper to call Terry Mason for 
the purpose identified even though she had not previ-
ously been listed as a witness. 
(3) Any other information which Terry Mason 
could have given would not be "newly discovered" and 
should have been produced at the trial. 
(4) Any testimony which Terry Mason could 
give regarding inconsistent statements would be 
cumulative and not new and would not be such as to 
render a different result probable on retrial. 
17. Kent Mason would purportedly testify that he observed 
jurors sleeping during the presentation of the evidence. 
With respect to the proffered testimony of Kent Mason, the 
Court takes judicial knowledge of the conduct of the jury during 
Open Court and finds no impropriety therein. 
18. David Blackwellf a defense attorney, has filed an 
affidavit regarding alleged juror misconduct which is discussed 
elsewhere herein. 
19. Joseph Johnson, a member of the venire has filed an 
affidavit regarding a conversation with the Sheriff during the 
jury selection process. The same is discussed elsewhere herein. 
* * * 
The cumulative impact of the testimony of all of the 
foregoing identified witnesses is not such as to render a 
different result probable on retrial, State v. Harris, 513 P.2d 
439 (Utah 1973) ; and this is so even disregarding the fact that 
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much of the testimony would not be "newly discovered", State v. 
Hawkins. 16 P2d 713 (Utah 1932), and much would be subject to 
exclusion as being irrelevant, immaterial or based upon hearsay 
once, twice or thrice removed and not reasonably calculated to 
lead to discovery of the truth. 
The Court is satisfied that the conviction of the Defendant 
is supported by an "unimpeachably fair and even-handed process". 
State v. Hadfield, supra, at p. 8. Further, the Court does not 
have any "suspicion that justice may have been miscarried because 
of a lack of enlightenment on a vital point, which the new 
evidence will supply". State v. Harris, supra, at 439-440. 
Accordingly the Court concludes that an evidentiary hearing 
would not serve a useful purpose, and the motion therefor is 
denied. 
IV. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
The merits of the defense motion for a new trial has been 
necessarily addressed to a major extent in the preceding 
discussion. Specifically, the alleged grounds for a new trial 
relating to so-called "newly discovered evidence" or "new 
exculpatory evidence" have been examined and found wanting. In 
truth, much of what has been proffered is not newly-discovered 
evidence (see State v. Williams. 712 P.2d 220, Utah 1985) but is 
cumulative, irrelevant, or inadmissible (see State v. Gellatly, 
449 P.2d 993, Utah 1969). 
The Court now turns to the grounds for a new trial which 
alleged (1) improper conversation between witness and juror, (2) 
jf J > ^ 
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improper conversation between witness and prospective juror, and 
(3) improper conversation between juror and clerk official. 
The Court approaches this area of inquiry with knowledge of 
recent rulings by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in 
State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Ut. App. 1987); State v. Erickson. 
749 P.2d 620 (Utah 1986) and State v. Pike, 712 P.2d 277 (Utah 
1985) . The Court is aware of the standard as enunciated in the 
Pike case that: 
A rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises from any 
unauthorized contact during a trial between witnesses, 
attorneys or court personnel and jurors, which goes 
beyond a mere incidental, unintended, and brief 
contact. At pg. 280. 
The Defendant claims two improper contacts with jurors 
occurred in this case. They will be examined in turn. 
JUROR GROVER SMITH. Co-defense counsel David Blackwell 
has filed an affidavit stating that during a recess of the trial 
he personally observed two conversations between Grover Smith and 
Deputy Sheriff Robert Nalwalker. The affidavit is dated May 23, 
1990 and was filed some 50 days after the trial concluded. At a 
hearing herein held on June 7, 1990, co-defense counsel Marcus 
Taylor advised the Court that he and Mr. Blackwell had discussed 
the contact which Blackwell had observed and had determined there 
was no problem associated therewith and accordingly made a 
decision not to raise any objection in relation thereto. 
Plaintiff has filed three affidavits by Deputy Nalwalker, County 
Clerk Valeen Brown and juror Grover Smith which do not contradict 
the Blackwell affidavit, but clarify and explain the conversat-
ions referred to therein. Counsel stipulated that the Court 
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could treat the affidavits as testimony. Simply stated, at a 
noon recess juror Grover Smith emerged from the men's room and 
discovered the other jurors had been taken to a local cafe for 
lunch. Smith briefly discussed the problem with Deputy Nalwalk-
er , who went to the Judge's chambers and asked for instructions. 
The Judge directed that Deputy Nalwalker and the County Clerk 
(who with consent of all counsel served as a baliff) should 
transport juror Smith to the cafe. Nalwalker reported the 
Court's instructions to Smith and the three traveled to the cafe 
in silence. 
With respect to juror Grover Smith the Court determines as 
follows: 
(1) The affidavits on file are not contradictory 
but are in harmony with each other. 
(2) There is not an issue of any material fact 
regarding the contact between juror Grover Smith and 
Deputy Robert Nalwalker. 
(3) There was no conversation between the juror 
and the Deputy other than that which was required to 
identify the fact of the juror's needing to be 
transported to a local cafe and of the arrangements 
made in relation thereto. 
(4) Other than for the identification of the 
problem the contact was authorized by the Court and 
consisted of carrying out the express directive of the 
Court. 
(5) The contact did not relate to the merits of 
the case in any way. 
(6) The contact did not involve discussion of any 
personal or private matters and was not such that it 
would breed a sense of familarity. 
(7) Taken together, the affidavits which are 
complimentary, explanatory and clarifying, and not 
contradictory, satisfactorily rebut the presumption 
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that prejudice to the Defendant resulted from the 
contact between juror Smith and Deputy Nalwalker. 
(8) Defense counsel were aware of the contact in 
question and made a decision not to raise any question 
in relation thereto. The Court concludes this 
constituted a waiver. It would not be appropriate for 
defense counsel to invite error, albeit by silence, and 
then to rely thereon. See State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 
1257 (Utah 1989) 
JUROR LESLIE SMITH/MARY MIKE CISERELIA. The defense 
has filed two affidavits of one Patricia Yero claiming a 
conversation between a juror and a person in the clerk's office 
regarding personal matters. The State has filed three affidavits 
by County Clerk Valeen Brown, juror Mary Mike Ciserella and 
alternate juror Leslie Smith which clarify and explain the 
conversation. The Yero (defense) affidavits describe a 
conversation in which a young, slender juror with long black hair 
had a discussion with a person in the clerk's office about their 
boys sleeping over, about the juror having work to do at home, 
and about the juror's desire to have the trial concluded. The 
defense affidavits do not indicate the identity of the person in 
the clerk's office and are unclear as to the identification of 
the juror. The second Yero affidavit assumes that the juror was 
Mary Mike Ciserella. 
The three affidavits filed by Plaintiff establish with 
certainty that the alleged improper conversation was between 
Leslie Smith, an alternate juror, and one Zina Wiltshire an 
employee from the office of the public health nurse who was 
temporarily assisting in the office of the county clerk while the 
regular clerk personnel were involved with the trial. Leslie 
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Smith, the alternate juror, is young, slender, with long black 
hair and has a boy the same age as Zina Wiltshire. Leslie Smith 
has, by affidavit, acknowledged a conversation with Zina 
Wiltshire which is consistent with the description of the 
conversation contained in the two Yero affidavits filed by the 
defense. On the other hand, Juror Mary Mike Ciserella is blonde 
and pregnant, does not have a boy, has only two small daughters 
ages two and three and one-half years and, by affidavit, has 
denied any conversation with anyone in the clerk's office 
regarding boys and the other items mentioned in the Yero 
affidavits. The affidavit of the County Clerk reaffirms that 
Zina Wiltshire substituted in her office on the day when Yero was 
paid a witness fee and that Leslie Smith was paid by the two 
vouchers issued on the same date, immediately prior to the 
voucher issued to Yero. 
As heretofore noted counsel stipulated that the Court could 
treat the affidavits as proffered testimony accepted by both 
sides and could proceed to make findings of fact based thereon. 
After careful consideration of the testimony thus admitted, the 
Court determines as follows, to-wit: 
(1) Zina Wiltshire, an employee in the office of 
the public health nurse temporarily assisted in the 
county clerk's office on March 28, 1990. 
(2) Zina Wiltshire was not regularly associated 
with the county clerk's office, was not a witness in 
the proceedings and had no involvement with the trial. 
(3) The county clerk's records reflect payment to 
Patricia Yero on March 28, 1990, and further reflect 
that alternate juror Leslie Smith was paid for jury 
service immediately prior to payment of Yero's witness 
fee. 
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(4) Alternate juror Leslie Smith fits the 
description contained in all of the affidavits as to 
the person that had the alleged improper conversation 
with the clerk official. Mary Mike Ciserella does not 
fit the description. 
(5) The alleged improper conversation did in fact 
take place between Zina Wiltshire who was assisting 
temporarily in the clerk's office and alternate juror 
Leslie Smith and did not involve juror Mary Mike 
Ciserella in any way. 
(6) Since Leslie Smith was an alternate juror and 
did not participate in the deliberations no prejudice 
could have resulted therefrom and accordingly the Court 
need not inquire further. 
PROSPECTIVE JUROR JOSEPH JOHNSON 
The final claim of an improper contact is. alleged to have 
occurred between Sheriff Brent Gottfredson and one Joseph 
Johnson, a member of the venire. 
Joseph Johnson has filed an affidavit claiming he was 
one of 16 potential jurors who remained available for jury 
selection after the completion of challenges for cause. He 
states that at a recess before exercise of preemptory challenges 
the Sheriff asked him his name. Johnson responded and the 
Sheriff told him he still could not place him. Johnson then told 
the Sheriff who his mother and grandfather were and that he had 
lived most of his life in Circleville. That is the whole of the 
conversation. Johnson was stricken with the State's first 
preemptory challenge. 
The State has not filed a counter affidavit, though the 
transcript of the jury selection proceedings reflects different 
timing. The Court record reflects that the Court took a 10 
minute recess prior to seating the 16 jurors who ultimately were 
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passed for cause. There was no further recess thereafter until 
the jury was fully impaneled. Prior to taking the recess the 
Court stated "why donft we take a 10 minute recess right now 
folks. Let me just indicate, please don't go out and talk about 
this case with anyone. Talk about other things, but not about 
this case." (Transcript of Proceedings, Jury Selection, p. 76) 
Accepting Johnsonfs statement regarding the conversation, this 
would have been the latest time in the proceedings that it could 
have occurred. The conversation alleged by Johnson does not 
violate the Court's caution. 
The Court further takes judicial notice of a letter of April 
15, 1990, submitted to it by Joseph Johnson while the Defendant 
was awaiting sentencing. In the letter from Joseph Johnson to 
the Court he states "I truly believe I could have been fair, but 
looking back maybe I shouldnft have been on the jury after all. 
Because as I said, I have known both Lew [the Defendant] and 
Lewis [the prosecution's eyewitness] for years and I know Lew is 
a good man and I know what Lewis is." [Emphasis by Johnson] 
Vickie Barton, mother of Joseph Johnson, also filed a letter with 
the Court in behalf of the Defendant prior to sentencing and has 
been named as a potential defense witness should an evidentiary 
hearing be held. With respect to the alleged improper contact 
between the Sheriff and Joseph Johnson the Court determines as 
follows: 
(1) There is no material issue in relation to the 
conversation between Joseph Johnson and the Sheriff 
which occurred at a recess prior to the panel being 
seated and passed for cause. 
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(2) Neither the Sheriff nor Joseph Johnson 
violated the Court's instructions to avoid talking 
about the case. 
(3) The Sheriff asked Johnson for his name. It 
was given. The Sheriff stated he still didn't place 
Johnson and so Johnson told him who his mother and 
grandfather were. Johnson also stated he had lived in 
Circleville most of his life. Nothing else was said. 
(4) Joseph Johnson was stricken in a preemptory 
challenge exercised by the State. 
(5) There is no evidence that the State's 
exercise of its preemptory challenge was improper in 
any way. 
(6) The letter from Joseph Johnson to the Court 
of April 15, 1990, suggests a personal bias by Joseph 
Johnson in favor of the Defendant and against the 
eyewitness for the Plaintiff. 
(7) Joseph Johnson offered no information during 
the jury selection process and in response to questions 
by the Court or counsel which would have revealed his 
prejudice or bias in favor of the Defendant. 
(8) There is nothing in the record to evidence 
the basis on which the State exercised its preemptory 
challenges, but it appears that it may have advanced 
the interests of fairness and justice by striking a 
potential juror who subsequently appears to have had a 
built-in bias in favor of the Defendant and against a 
key state witness. 
CLAIM OF INADEQUATE REPRESENTATION 
While not originally advanced as a basis for a new trial, 
the affidavit of the Defendant's wife, Arva Lee Day, calls into 
question the adequacy of representation by defense counsel Marcus 
Taylor. The affidavit contains excessive hearsay, unsupported 
opinions and conclusions and highly-generalized and factually 
unsupported allegations regarding discovery. With respect to 
this affidavit and the allegations therein contained, the Court 
determines as follows: 
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(1) There is nothing in the record which would 
suggest anything other than full compliance with 
discovery requests. 
(2) This Court has heard hundreds of cases during 
the last seventeen years, including numerous homicide 
cases, and at the conclusion of this trial expressed 
the opinion, and restates it here, that this is perhaps 
the best tried case on the part of both the prosecution 
and the defense that this Court has heard. 
(3) This Court is not aware of any fact or factor 
which would tend to establish that this Defendant did 
not receive thorough and competent legal 
representation. 
(4) The Court has appointed new counsel to handle 
Defendant's appeal and/or pre-appeal motions. This is 
based on Defendant's request and upon his 
dissatisfaction with prior counsel, and not upon any 
evidence that Defendant was not well represented prior 
to appointment of new counsel. 
C O N C L U S I O N 
The Court concludes that there is an inadequate basis for 
granting a new trial herein. The Defendant was properly 
represented and fairly tried. Piute County is small in 
population (some 1500 people) as is Junction Town where the 
county seat is located (some 200 people). Great care was taken 
to guard against potential problems. There are limited restroom 
facilities in the Courthouse and only two small cafes in town to 
service the needs of all who participated in the trial. The 
Court issued directives giving jurors preferential access to 
restroom facilities and encouraging the jurors to eat at one cafe 
and others involved with the trial to eat at the other cafe or 
elsewhere. On more than one occassion the Court arranged to have 
meals prepared and brought to the Court House for the jurors. 
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Frequent admonishments were given to the jury and all others 
associated with the trial and a high level of cooperation and 
professionalism was exhibited. The Defendant was fairly tried 
and convicted by a jury of his peers and there is no basis for 
granting a new trial. 
This is a final Order, and accordingly, the Defendant is 
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MR. BLACKWELL: Thank you. That's all. 
MR. McIFF: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Officer. 
Call your next u/itness. 
MR. McIFF: I u/ill call Harold Morrill. 
[BAILIFF SUMMONED WITNESS FROM OUTSIDE COURTROOM] 
THE COURT: If you'll raise your right hand and be 
su/orn, sir. 
[WITNESS SWORN] 
THE COURT: You may be seated here, Mr. Morrill. 
HAROLD MORRILL, called and su/orn for Plaintiff, testified 
as follou/s: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. McIFF: 
Q Mr. Morrill, u/ould you please state your full name 
and address. 
A Harold Darrell Morrill Marysvale, Utah, 10-Mile 
Ranch, Marysvale Valley. 
Q You testified at the preliminary hearing in this 
matter, did you not? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Betu/een then and nou; you had an accident u/here you 
sustained an injury to your face; is that correct? 
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A Yes. I did. 
Q Were you residing at the 10-Mile Ranch on August 
the 10th, 1989? 
A Yes, I u/as. 
Q Who occupied that home? 
A My dad lived in it then. 
Q Your parents lived there? 
A Yeah. They did then. They've moved since then. 
Q Were you staying u/ith them at the time—? 
A Yes, I u/as. 
Q —u/ith your children? 
A Um-hm. With my little boy and little girl. We'd 
just moved out there right before then. 
Q On the evening of August the 10th, 1989, do you 
recall u/hat you u/ere doing tou/ards sundou/n? 
A Yeah. I u/as giving my little girl a bath. It u/as 
just getting about to their bedtime and I u/as just getting her 
and the little boy ready for bed. 
Q Are you acquainted u/ith Leu/is Sudu/eeks? 
A Yes. I've known Leu/is quite a u/hile. 
Q Look, will you, a the at STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 1. 
[INDICATED] 
We've undertaken to show on that exhibit t\m Dais Merrill hoimt 
in the lower lefthand corner—? 
A Um-hm. 
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[INDICATED ON EXHIBIT] 
Q —the lane that leads from the east to that home,— 
[INDICATED] 
— t o the north of that a road up on a hill that goes up to 
US-89--
[INDICATED] 
—the Thompsonville Road, running north, and a road that goes 
to the Paul Henrie ranch, running to the southeast;— 
[INDICATED] 
—are you familiar u/ith that area? 
A Yeah. 
Q Is that a reasonable approximation of the road 
pattern and other features in that area? 
[INDICATED EXHIBIT] 
A Yeah. That looks right. 
Q Did you have contact u/ith Leu/is Sudu/eeks on the 
night of August the 10th? 
A Yeah. He come up to the ranch. 
Q Where u/ere you u/hen he came? 
A I u/as in the kitchen and I looked out the window 
and I could just see somebody coming up the lane to the house. 
He u/as about half u/ay up the lane u/hen I seen him. 
Q What did you do? 
A I didn't know who it was at first. And as he got a 
little bit closer, then I could tell who it was and so I 
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i stepped out of the house to see u/hat u/as going on and talked 
2 to him. 
3 Q Did you ta lk u/ith him? 
4 A Yeah. I d id . 
5 Q What did he say? 
6 I] A He told m e that—u/hen he got up to the house, he 
7 came up to the steps and got to the steps and I asked him u/hat 
8 u/as going on. And he told me that Leu/ had been shooting at 
9 him and he u/anted m e — h e asked u/here Dad u/as and he u/anted a 
IO ride home. 
n Q Anything else he said? 
12 A No. Just that that Leu/ had been shooting at him. 
13 He u/anted me to go u/ith him back down to the truck and talk to 
14 Leu/ again. But I had my little girl in the bathtub so I 
is couldn't. I told him I couldn't go and I asked him if he 
16 u/anted to come in the house and sit down, that dad u/as up 
17 moving the sprinklers, and he said no, he'd just u/ait out 
18 there on the steps. So I u/ent back in the house. 
19 Q Do you have any u/ay of identifying approximately 
20 u/hen that u/as? 
2i A It u/as—I'm not sure of the time. It u/as just, you 
22 knouz, in the evening just as the sun u/as going down. It u/as 
23 either down or, you know, it was dusk. I hadn't looked at the 
24 clock, so I'm not sure of the time. 
25 Q After you and he had the brief conversation, he 
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wanted you to go back with him, but you weren't able to 
because you were taking care of your children. What did he do 
and what did you do? 
A I went in the house to get Melisa out of the 
bathtub and put Kevin in. 
Q What did he do? 
A He was sitting on the steps when I went in 
and—excuse me—I went in the house and after I got Melisa 
out, I come out and he was gone. And my niece was there, 
Mandy. She was outside hanging clothes and I asked her where 
he went and she said she didn't know if he'd went up— 
[INDICATED] 
—or that way or what. 
[INDICATED] 
Q Your dad was not there then? 
A No. 
Q And he arrived? 
A He come in just—I don't know. Probably 10 or 15 
minutes after that, he come in the house. 
Q Where did you meet your father? 
A Just on the porch. I started to tell him what, you 
know, was going on and, you know, I really didn't know what 
was going on. I started to tell Dad what Lewis had told me 
and that's when Lewis come through the door a second time. 
Q How did he come through the door? 
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1 II A He come through it. He didn't open it or nothing. 
2 He knocked it off the hinges and come in. He broke the door 
3 off the hinges and just come busting in. 
4 Q Were you able to observe his demeanor? 
5 A He u/as scared. He u/as real scared. 
6 Q Did he say anything? 
7 A He u/as saying all kinds of stuff and then he told 
8 Dad to call the cops and he just said Lew had shot his buddy. 
9 And Dad sat and talked to him then and then called up Brent. 
10 Q When you came out of the bathroom, after having 
n taken care of your children, out into the kitchen area, you 
12 say he u/as gone then? 
13 A Yeah. He u/as gone then. 
u Q Do you recall doing anything else before your 
15 f a t h e r came in? 
16 A J u s t I ' d got M e l i s a ' s pajamas on her and got Kevin 
17 out of t he tub and I j u s t had him in a tou/el u/hile I u/as 
18 t a l k i n g t o dad. I u/as j u s t d ry ing him off and u/as t a l k i n g t o 
19 Dad and t h a t ' s u/hen Leu/is came back. 
20 MR. McIFF: I s e e . 
21 You can cross examine. 
22 THE COURT: Counsel? 
23 CROSS EXAMINATION 
24 BY MR. BLACKWELL: 
25 Q Okay. I don't want to call you Mr. Morrill. We 
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know each other too well to do that. So, Harold, let me ask 
you when Lewis came over the first time, he said that Lew had 
shot at him, but he didn't say anything about David Kile being 
shot at that time, did he? 
A No. He didn't. 
Q Did he state, also, that he wanted a ride to 
Kingston? 
A Yes. He did. 
Q Now you will recall that you testified in 
preliminary hearing. 
A Um-hm. 
Q You also recall that your testimony at that time 
was that Lewis disappeared off the porch for approximately 20 
to 30 minutes? 
A Yeah. It was during the time when I got Melisa out 




Q 20 to 30 minutes? 
A Yeah. Somewhere in there. 
Q When Lewis showed up, he had a beer in his hand, 
didn't he? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q In fact, he sat and drank that beer as you and he 
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1 talked. 
2 A Yes. 
3 Q Did you hear any shots that night? 
4 A No. I didn't hear nothing. 
5 [COUNSEL CHECKED NOTES] 
6 II MR. BLACKWELL: That's all I have. Thank you. 
7 THE COURT: Counsel? 
8 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
9 BY MR. McIFF: 
io Q Mr. Morrill, do you recall at any time that evening 
n looking at a clock? 
12 A N o . I never did look at a clock. I didn't have 
13 any reason to, you know. I u/as just--
14 Q The times you've given us, are they estimates? 
15 A Yes. They are. 
i6 Q When you l e f t Leu/is Sudu/eeks s i t t i n g on your porch , 
17 u/ent back in the bathroom, u/as your daughter in the tub then? 
18 A Yes, she u/as. 
19 Q You got her out? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q And your little boy, put him in a tou/el? 
22 A Put him in the tub. But in the meantime, u/hile he 
23 u/as in the tub, I got her pajamas and stuff on. Probably took 
24 m e 5 to 10 m i n u t e s . And then I got him out and then dad u/as 
25 there by that time. 
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' Q And was Lewis gone by that time? 
2
 A Yes. 
3 Q So whatever time lapse it u/as, can you remember 
4
 doing anything other than getting your daughter out and then 
5
 putting your son in, and then you got her pajamas on and then 
6
 you got your son out and wrapped him in a towel and walked 
7 back out? Lewis was gone and your dad came in? 
8 A Yes, however long that took. 
9 Q Okay. 
io MR. McIFF: I think that's all. Thank you. 
11
 RECROSS EXAMINATION 
12 BY MR. BLACKWELL: 
13 Q Harold, you also said you went out and talked to 
14 M a n d y — ? 
15 A Yeah. I asked her where Lewis had went and she 
16 said she didn't know if he'd went down the lane or up the road 
17 where dad was changing sprinklers. 
18 Q — a n d took your girl out, and your boy was in the 
19 tub? 
20 A Um-hm. 
21 Q And you also gave him a bath during that time? 
22 A Yes . 
23 MR. BLACKWELL: T h a t ' s a l l I h a v e . 
24 FURTHER REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
25 BY MR. McIFF: 
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Q Do you have any u/ay of knou/ing u/hen Leu/is Sudu/eeks 
l e f t your porch? 
A I don't. 
Q You u/ere in the bathroom? 
A Yeah. By the time I u/ent in—just in the time I 
u/ent in and got Melisa out of the bathtub. 
Q And came out u/ith your boy? 
A Come out—no. I got Melisa out of the bathtub and 
put Kevin in. And I came out u/ith Melisa and got her pajamas 
on. When I came out, he u/as gone then. 
MR. McIFF: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Counsel? 
MR. BLACKWELL: Nothing. 
THE COURT: Thank you. That's all. 
May he be excused? 
MR. McIFF: He may. 
MR. BLACKWELL: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. McIFF: I call Dale Morrill. 
THE COURT: Would this be a good time to take a 
recess? 
MR. McIFF: Fine. 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the Jury, u/e're 
about to take a recess for 10 minutes. Once again, it's the 
duty of this Court to admonish you, you are not to talk about 
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AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT NALWALKER 
Case No. 89-CR-19 
ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SEVIER ) 
ROBERT NALWALKER, being first duly sworn of oath 
deposes and states as follows, to-wit: 
1. I reside in Junction, Utah, am of adult age and 
serve Piute County as a deputy sheriff. 
2. I appeared at and assisted in trial proceedings in 
the case State of Utah v. Lew Day, held in Junction, Utah, 
beginning March 26, 1990 and continuing through March 30, 1990. 
3. At a lunch recess during the course of the trial I 
observed one juror, to-wit Grover Smith, emerge from the mens1 
restroom. I was aware that the jurors were being taken to lunch 
2 
by court officials and I had seen them leave the building, enter 
motor vehicles and drive away moments before. I was surprised to 
see Mr. Smith and advised him that the other jurors had gone with 
court personnel and that he should have been with them. I told 
Mr. Smith I would go talk to the Judge and see what he wanted us 
to do. I went to the Judgefs chambers, described the problem and 
asked for direction. The Judge told me to take the county clerk, 
who served as a bailiff, and deliver Mr. Smith to Dayna's Cafe 
were the other jurors had been taken. I went back out into the 
hallway and advised Mr. Smith what the Judge had said and told 
him that the clerk and I would take him to were the other jurors 
were located. The three of us entered my motor vehicle on the 
south side of the courthouse and we traveled without conversing 
with each other to Dayna's Cafe where Mr. Smith joined the other 
jurors . 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED this rjS' day of May, 1990. 
ROBERT NALWALKER 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before roe this 5^ 5" day of 
May, 1990. 
^ M ' CUATL-. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing a t : lpu^</xi&£ 
My commission e x p i r e s : £y 
3 
AFFJPAVTT OF HAILING 
I hereby certify that a full, true and correct copy of 
the above and foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT NALWALKER was placed 
in the United States mail at Richfield, Utah, with first-class 
postage thereon fully prepaid on the Cyi day of May, 1990, 
addressed as follows: 
Mr. Marcus Taylor 
Mr. David A. Blackwell 
Labrum, Taylor & Blackwell 
P. O. Box 728 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
5 ? ^ : Ci^Jzk 
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KAY L. McIFF 
PIUTE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
225 North 100 East 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
Telephone: 801 896-5441 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF PIUTE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 





AFFIDAVIT OF GROVER SMITH 
Case No. 89-CR-19 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF PIUTE 
ss. 
GROVER SMITH, being first duly sworn on oath deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. I reside on the south edge of Circleville, Utah, 
am of adult age and served as a juror in the case State of Utah 
v. Lew Day. 
2. During a lunch recess of the Lew Day trial, I came 
out of the restroom and noticed the other jurors were gone. I 
then had a brief conversation with Deputy Nalwalker regarding the 
fact that other jurors had been transported to a local cafe for 
lunch. Then deputy Nalwalker told me to wait. He returned in a 
2 
few moments and told me that he and the County Clerk would take 
me to the cafe where the other jurors had gone. I got in the 
Deputy's car and the three of us drove a mile or so to the cafe. 
We traveled in silence. I did not have any other conversation 
with Deputy Nalwalker during the trial. 
3. The foregoing is true and accurate. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAYETH NOT. 
DATED this^/___ day of June, 1990. 
GROVER SMITH 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /yH day of 
June, 1990. 
WtJ a. M/MWA 
NOTARY PUBLIC /t • /, ^ifl'^-fu VV<'-
Residing at: CUC(tlMMt-,lff-:^\,\ 
My commission expires: \,sy -. < 
